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THE FIRST YEAR: THE ROLE OF A MODERN LENDER OF LAST RESORT
Kathryn Judge
Insufficient liquidity can trigger fire sales and wreak havoc on a financial system. To
address these challenges, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) and other central banks have long had
the authority to provide financial institutions liquidity when market-based sources run dry. Yet,
liquidity injections sometimes fail to quell market dysfunction. When liquidity shortages
persist, they are often symptoms of deeper problems plaguing the financial system. This Essay
shows that continually pumping new liquidity into a financial system in the midst of a
persistent liquidity shortage may increase the fragility of the system and, on its own, is unlikely
to resolve the deeper problems causing those liquidity shortages to persist.
This Essay suggests that when facing persistent liquidity shortages, the Fed should
instead use the leverage it enjoys by virtue of controlling access to liquidity to improve its
understanding of the ailments causing the market dysfunction to persist and to help address
those underlying issues. When liquidity shortages persist, they will often indicate that market
participants lack critical information about risk exposures or that they are concerned financial
institutions or other entities lack sufficient capital in light of the risks to which they are exposed.
Providing credible information and working with other policymakers to ensure the overall
financial system is sufficiently capitalized are thus among the issues that the Fed should
prioritize when facing persistent liquidity shortages. This Essay thus provides a new paradigm
for how the Fed can utilize its lender-of-last-resort authority to prevent a nascent financial crisis
from erupting into one that inflicts significant harm on the real economy.
The heart of this Essay brings these dynamics to life through a close examination of the
Fed’s actions during the early stages of the 2007--2009 financial crisis (the Crisis). Using
transcripts from Fed meetings and other primary materials, the Essay reconstructs the first
thirteen months of the Crisis. The analysis reveals more than a year during which Fed officials
could have taken an array of actions that may have reduced the size of the Great Recession and
the amount of credit risk and moral hazard stemming from the government’s subsequent
interventions. The analysis also demonstrates specific ways that the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort
authority could serve as the type of responsive and dynamic regulatory tool that the Fed
requires when seeking to restore stability during the early phases of a panic.
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INTRODUCTION
Dynamism is a central challenge for regulation today.1 Nowhere is this challenge more
acute than in financial regulation, where the very act of regulating causes activity to move to
less regulated spaces.2 And at no time is the problem more pressing than in the midst of a
financial crisis, which often emanates from fragilities in those less regulated domains.3 This
Essay reveals that the Federal Reserve (the Fed) need not wait for Congress to expand its
oversight authority to tackle these challenges right at their source. It can instead use the
leverage it enjoys by virtue of controlling access to liquidity to obtain critical information about
the challenges it is facing and to start addressing those challenges. The Essay thus sheds critical
new light on how a central bank can best use its lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) authority to
contain a growing financial crisis.
This Essay advances the LOLR literature by showing that the optimal role for a LOLR to
play depends on the type of liquidity shortage it is facing. Some liquidity shortages are caused
by an exogenous event, like the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The current LOLR literature accurately
captures the ways that such shocks can trigger a dangerous cycle of liquidity shortages and fire
sales that harm the financial system.4 Under these circumstances, the standard prescription that
a LOLR should flood the market with liquidity, subject only to moral hazard and credit risk
considerations, is apt.5 When the cause of the problem is exogenous to the system, liquidity
alone will often suffice to restore market functioning and the shortages will be finite.
The 2007--2009 financial crisis (the Crisis), however, and other periods of financial
distress have a very different arc. During these episodes, liquidity shortages persist despite

See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative
State, 100 Geo. L. J. 53, 78 (2011) (identifying “continuous change and variation . . . as the most pervasive
challenge of current public problems”).
2 See, e.g., Paul Tucker, The Lender of Last Resort and Modern Central Banking: Principles and
Reconstruction, in Bank for Int’l Settlements, BIS Papers No. 79: Re-Thinking the Lender of Last Resort 10,
17 (2014), http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap79.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(explaining “regulatory arbitrage is endemic” to modern finance).
3 See, e.g., Robert F. Bruner & Sean D. Carr, The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect
Storm 65--70 (2009) (explaining financial crisis of 1907 emanated from trust companies engaged in
activities similar to those of banks but subject to different public and private regulatory regimes); see also
infra Part III (showing central role of shadow banking system in Crisis).
4 See infra Part I (explaining how current literature focuses on reasons for bank runs and ways in which
LOLR can stem such runs).
5 See infra section I.A.
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countervailing efforts by a LOLR to address them. Persistent liquidity shortages pose a very
different challenge and, in a modern financial system, convey distinct and important
information. In today’s more complete markets, which include a robust interbank lending
market and a developed regime for sale and repurchase agreements (repos), a financial
institution that is healthy or in possession of high-quality collateral should be able to access
liquidity from market-based sources. Thus, when liquidity shortages persist in the face of
aggressive efforts by a central bank to address them, those shortages are not just potential
aggravators of systemic distress, they are also symptoms signaling the existence of deeper
problems plaguing the financial system. Continuing to pump liquidity into the market during
such periods functions as a palliative: It may temporarily reduce the pain, but it will not rectify
the underlying problems---and it may even make things worse by allowing those problems to
fester.
Fortunately, in conjunction with posing distinct challenges, persistent liquidity
shortages also pose distinct opportunities. The untapped potential of the Fed’s LOLR authority
arises from the fact that during periods of systemic distress, liquidity will tend to be scarce, and,
hence, valuable. Controlling access to liquidity is thus a tool that becomes more potent in
precisely the circumstances the Fed needs it most. Just as importantly, the liquidity shortages
will often serve as a roadmap to the underlying challenges plaguing the financial system, as
lack of liquidity in a domain where liquidity previously was plentiful is often an indication of
where the deeper problems lie.6 This Essay shows how the Fed can more effectively use its
LOLR authority to promote systemic stability---the mandate that justified giving this authority
to the Fed when it was founded in 1913, and which continues to justify the Fed’s role in today’s
far more complex financial system. The focus is on information.
The claim is simple: The Fed should use its LOLR authority to obtain critical information
about the underlying issues that are causing the market dysfunction to persist. When it appears
that market participants are hesitant to work with one another because of a lack of information,
the Fed should also play a role in helping to overcome the frictions impeding the creation and
redistribution of critical information. And when it appears that market participants are pulling
back because of legitimate concerns about the financial health of other financial institutions, the
Fed should use its authority, and work with other regulators and Congress, as needed, to help
ensure that financial institutions are adequately capitalized in light of the risks to which they
are exposed. In short, the Fed should more fully embrace the role it has often, albeit
inconsistently, played as an “information coordination agent” during periods of systemic
financial distress.7
The revised paradigm here proposed, while consistent with aspects of how the Fed has
often used its formal and informal authority in the past, marks an important shift in the theory
about how a LOLR should respond to systemic distress. The current paradigm, invoked

See infra Part IV (identifying specific ways in which events during early stages of Crisis alerted Fed
officials to particular information gaps contributing to market dysfunction).
7 See infra notes 69--74 and accompanying text.
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repeatedly by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke in explaining how the Fed used its authority during
the Crisis and by outside courts and commentators assessing the Fed’s actions, comes from a
nineteenth-century British commentator.8 That paradigm is focused, almost exclusively, on
addressing the ways that insufficient liquidity can aggravate systemic distress. This Essay, by
contrast, builds on the insight that when liquidity remains in short supply despite aggressive
efforts by the Fed to provide fresh liquidity to the financial system, deeper problems are causing
those liquidity shortages to persist.9 Following the established paradigm without seeking to
understand and address those underlying issues will only make the system more fragile and
increase the ultimate size and scope of the crisis to come. When facing persistent systemic
distress, the Fed should accordingly change course. Rather than just using its LOLR authority
to help contain the distress that can arise from insufficient liquidity, the Fed should also use its
LOLR authority to serve as an information coordination agent---facilitating the collection and
production of the information required to understand why liquidity shortages are persisting.
Only by gathering such information and helping to disseminate critical information to market
participants, other regulators, and Congress, can the Fed best fulfill its role of helping to contain
a growing financial crisis.
Recognizing that these concepts are best demonstrated through example, the heart of
this Essay is a detailed examination of the first year of the Crisis. This case study illuminates the
central role that informational challenges played in inhibiting market functioning during the
Crisis and the ways that informational challenges limited the capacity of Fed and other
policymakers to understand the nature and scope of the problems plaguing the financial
system. The examination also establishes that---contrary to a common assumption that the
Crisis began in September 2008,10 when Lehman Brothers failed and the Crisis exploded---the
Crisis actually began thirteen months earlier, in August 2007.11
Although largely overlooked in the extensive literature on the Crisis, this interim period
is the critical juncture when trying to assess whether Fed and other policymakers could have
done more to prevent the ultimate fallout that made the Crisis the Crisis. Before August 2007,

See notes 19--26, 52 and accompanying text (describing Bagehot’s dictum and its use by Fed
policymakers to explain Fed’s actions); see also Kathryn Judge, A Different Take on the AIG Case: The
Dangers of Invoking 19th Century Principles to Solve 21st Century Problems, CLS Blue Sky Blog (June 23,
2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/06/23/another-take-on-aig-the-dangers-of-invoking19th-century-principles-to-solve-21st-century-problems [http://perma.cc/B2ED-9BUD] (“Ben Bernanke
and other leading policymakers regularly invoked Bagehot’s dictum to defend their actions during the
recent financial crisis, and outside experts similarly invoked Bagehot to assess the appropriateness of
those actions.”).
9 See infra section II.C.ii (suggesting that when market participants lack critical information on
creditworthiness of counterparties and value of collateral, they will be hesitant to trade and liquidity
shortages are likely to persist).
10 See, e.g., notes 303--304 (interrogating assumption that, prior to September 2008, incipient Crisis was
too amorphous and ill-defined to motivate Congressional action).
11 See sources cited infra note 113.
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markets appeared to be stable and well-functioning, making it nearly impossible for
policymakers to appreciate just how fragile the financial system had become.12 By September
2008, the Fed and other policymakers had no attractive options.13 As reflected in the massive
ripples emanating from Lehman’s bankruptcy, allowing systemically significant institutions to
fail crippled market functioning, leading to severe and adverse spillover effects on the real
economy. Yet the only alternative available given the government’s relative lack of information--bailing out institutions like AIG---gave rise to massive moral hazard and exposed the
government to credit risk.14 As the only period during which policymakers had been alerted to
the systemic risk that had built up in the financial system and had time to take actions that
could have altered the course ahead, the first year of the Crisis had the potential to be pivotal.
Working closely with primary materials, including meeting transcripts of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC), a core decisionmaking body of the Fed, this Essay
reexamines the decisions that Fed policymakers made and could have made during this critical
period. The analysis shows that the Fed is already putting itself at the forefront of crisis
containment efforts and that using its LOLR authority in the way proposed is consistent, in
spirit, with the Fed’s established approach of taking the lead in doing whatever is necessary to
help contain a looming financial crisis. At the same time, the analysis also reveals numerous
junctures at which Fed policymakers might well have made different, and better, decisions had
Fed and other policymakers embraced the view that the Fed should use its LOLR authority in
the ways here proposed.15 The purpose of this analysis is not to fault Fed policymakers, but to

See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming 4 (2012)
(stating prior to Crisis, economists “had the view that a crisis would not occur in the United States, that
the problem had been solved”); Ben S. Bernanke, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at
the Meeting of the Eastern Economic Association: The Great Moderation (Feb. 20, 2004),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/Speeches/2004/20040220/ [http://perma.cc/E443-5ZVH]
(noting “[o]ne of the most striking features of the economic landscape over the past twenty years or so
has been a substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility” and describing various explanations for the
“Great Moderation”).
13 The Federal Reserve System consists of the seven-member Board of Governors (the Board), twelve
regional banks which function as the operating arm of the system, and the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), which consists of all members of the Board and five regional bank presidents. See
Richard S. Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey R. Miller, The Law of Financial Institutions 61 (5th ed.
2013). This Essay specifies among these bodies when appropriate but, given the high degree of overlap
and common purpose, it often focuses on the Fed without specifying a particular body within it.
14 For further discussion of the costs of these two events, see infra section III.D. Typically, the parties that
most benefit when an institution is bailed out are the institution’s creditors. This leads to an array of
market distortions. Perceptions that an institution is too big (or otherwise systemically significant or
politically connected) to fail alter creditors’ analyses, increasing their willingness to extend credit and
causing them to do so on excessively favorable terms. This distorts competition, incents institutions to
grow or otherwise alter their risk profiles in ways that increase expectations they will receive a bailout,
and facilitates excessive risk taking.
15 See infra Part IV.
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understand and alter the forces inhibiting their willingness to use the Fed’s LOLR authority in
the manner most likely to successfully contain a financial crisis once underway.
This Essay proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the rationales for having a LOLR and
how the Fed used its LOLR authority during the Crisis. Part II presents the Essay’s claim---that
a central bank facing persistent liquidity shortages should use its LOLR authority to understand
and help coordinate a response to the ailments giving rise to those shortages. The focus is on
information. Part III reconstructs the critical first year of the Crisis. Using transcripts of
meetings of the FOMC, autobiographies of leading policymakers, a detailed report prepared in
conjunction with the Lehman bankruptcy, and other sources, it shows what policymakers knew
and believed throughout the relevant period. Part IV considers how the Crisis may have played
out differently had the Fed used its LOLR authority in the manner here proposed. Part V
examines drawbacks to the proposed approach. Lack of liquidity remains an aggravator of
systemic distress and expanding the aims that liquidity facilities are designed to serve may
increase concerns about stigma, create operational challenges, or otherwise reduce the provision
of liquidity. The analysis nonetheless suggests that most of these issues could be managed, and
it sheds light on how a central bank might operationalize the proposed approach.
I.

LENDER OF LAST RESORT

In the United States and most other jurisdictions, the central bank functions as the
LOLR. This means that the Fed has the authority to provide collateralized loans to banks16 and,
in “unusual and exigent circumstances,” to nonbanks.17 The role of a LOLR is to provide the
liquidity banks and other institutions need to avoid fire sales and satisfy short-term creditors
when market-based sources of liquidity are scarce.18 Banks and other financial institutions
secure these loans by posting less liquid assets as collateral. This Part examines the reasons for
having a central bank that can serve as a LOLR during periods of systemic distress and how
those rationales have evolved over time. It then provides a quick summary of the Fed’s LOLR
activities during the Crisis and how the established-but-outdated paradigm of how a LOLR
should respond to systemic distress appears to have shaped the Fed’s actions and third-party
assessments of the same.
A.

Background: Evolving Rationales

The notion that a central bank should function as the LOLR goes back at least to 1802
and the work of Henry Thornton.19 Yet today, the origins of the concept are typically associated

See 12 U.S.C. § 347b (2012) (“Any Federal Reserve bank . . . may make advances to any member bank . .
. .”).
17 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (2012).
18 See, e.g., Thomas M. Humphrey, The Classical Concept of the Lender of Last Resort, Fed. Res. Bank of
Richmond Econ. Rev. (Jan.--Feb. 1975) (“The objective of the central bank in time of panic is to satisfy the
market’s demand for liquidity.”).
19 See, e.g., Thomas M. Humphrey, Lender of Last Resort: The Concept in History, Fed. Res. Bank of
Richmond Econ. Rev., Mar.--Apr. 1989, at 8, 8--12, https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/
research/economic_review/1989/er750202.cfm [hereinafter Humphrey, Lender of Last Resort]
16
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with the 1873 publication of Lombard Street, a still-influential text in which Walter Bagehot
argued that the Bank of England was right to extend loans to any party with appropriate
collateral during times of systemic distress, subject to certain conditions designed to address the
corresponding moral hazard.20 As Bagehot explained, in the face of a crisis, injecting additional
liquidity into the financial system in this fashion could not guarantee a good outcome, but
failure to do so would guarantee a bad one.21 His prescription, embodied in a series of
guidelines known today as Bagehot’s dictum, was that a central bank should lend freely during
a crisis, subject to constraints designed to reduce the inevitable moral hazard and credit risk.22
At the time Thornton and Bagehot were writing, and even at the Fed’s founding, LOLR
activity was the primary mechanism through which a central bank could affect overall
monetary supply.23 A central rationale underlying their analyses thus related to the need to
maintain the money stock.24 Since the 1930s, however, LOLR operations have played only a
modest role in this regard.25 Open market operations (OMO), through which the Fed alters the
level of reserves in the financial system by buying, selling, borrowing, and lending Treasury
securities, have largely superseded discounting as the primary mechanism through which the
Fed implements monetary policy.26

(explaining Henry Thornton “identified the Bank of England’s distinguishing characteristics as an
L[O]LR,” “specified the L[O]LR’s primary function,” and “distinguished between the micro and
macroeconomic aspects of this function,” among other contributions).
20 See Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market 196--99 (1873) (arguing “in
time of panic it [the central bank] must advance freely and vigorously” while keeping interest rates high
as deterrent against idle borrowing); Peter Conti-Brown, Misreading Walter Bagehot: What Lombard
Street Really Means for Central Banking, The New Rambler (Dec. 14, 2015) (reviewing Walter Bagehot,
Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (1873)), http://newramblerreview.com/bookreviews/economics/misreading-walter-bagehot-what-lombard-street-really-means-for-central-banking
(explaining that “Bagehot became the first to articulate what a central bank should do to prevent a panic
from becoming a crisis” as “common trope”).
21 See Bagehot, supra note 20, at 198--99. In this sense, he was more prescient than many economists
writing in his wake.
22 See id. at 197--99.
23 See, e.g., George G. Kaufman, Lender of Last Resort: A Contemporary Perspective, in Financial Crises,
Contagion, and the Lender of Last Resort: A Reader 169, 182--83 (Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Illing eds.,
2002) (“In the early days, . . . analysts gave heavy weight in justifying L[O]LR intervention to the
protection of the money supply.”).
24 See Humphrey, supra note 19, at 16 (“Thornton and Bagehot believed the LL[O]R had the duty . . . to
protect the money stock.”).
25 See Kaufman, supra note 23, at 180 (“As financial markets developed in strength and resiliency, . . .
market operations preempt[ed] the discount window as the major tool of policy . . . .”).
26 See, e.g., Xavier Freixas et al., The Lender of Last Resort: A Twenty-First Century Approach, 2 J. Eur.
Econ. Ass’n 1085, 1086 (2004) (noting “Bagehot view of the LOLR is often seen as obsolete in a welldeveloped financial system”); see generally Perry Mehrling, The New Lombard Street: How the Fed
Became the Dealer of Last Resort (2010) (providing thorough historical overview of this evolution).
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This has led to a second generation of scholarship that premised the need for a LOLR on
the inherent instability of banks and the adverse consequences of fire sales.27 Two defining
characteristics of banks are their use of fractional reserves and their role in maturity
transformation.28 Much of a bank’s funding takes the form of short-term liabilities, like demand
deposits, while most of its assets are long-term and relatively illiquid, like loans to businesses
and individuals. This works most of the time, as the bank retains sufficient liquid assets to meet
typical depositor demands. The system breaks down, however, when depositor demands
become correlated, as they do during a bank run.29 Once a bank depletes its liquid reserves, it
must sell illiquid assets to obtain the cash needed to pay off other depositors.30 The illiquid
nature of the assets and the need to sell them in a very short timeframe leads to “fire sales,” at
prices well below the best value price of the assets sold,31 a process that could cause even a
healthy bank to wind up insolvent.32 This can give rise to a range of ripple effects, in part
because other banks holding similar assets may be forced to write them down, causing losses to
spread and threatening the stability of other institutions.33

See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 23, at 182 (explaining how “[p]rotection of macro-liquidity has shifted
from protection of the aggregate money supply to protection of equilibrium asset prices,” and assuming,
in both instances, the thing from which the system needs protection is a “sudden adverse shock[] that
cause[s] markets to temporarily overadjust” (emphasis added)); Tucker, supra note 2, at 15 (explaining by
“providing liquidity” when banks face runs by short-term creditors, “the central bank reduces the need
for a forced sale of assets that otherwise would depress values, causing avoidable insolvencies and
knocking the economy as a whole onto an inferior equilibrium growth path”).
28 Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 13, at 40, 45.
29 See Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Possibility of Bank Runs, 60 J.
Fin. 1293, 1293 (2005) (“The maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities makes banks inherently
unstable by exposing them to the possibility of panic-based runs. Such runs occur when investors rush to
withdraw their deposits” because they know that every bank lacks sufficient short-term, liquid assets to
pay off all depositors).
30 See id. at 1293--94 (“As a result [of a run], the bank is forced to liquidate its long-term investments at a
loss” and may fail).
31 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, 25 J. Econ. Persp.
29, 30 (2011) (defining fire sales as “forced in the sense that the seller cannot pay creditors without selling
assets” and explaining “[t]he price is dislocated because the highest potential bidders are typically . . .
themselves indebted and cannot borrow more to buy the asset” (citing Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny,
Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. Fin. 1343, 1346--47 (1992))).
32 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. Pol.
Econ. 401, 402 (1984) (demonstrating why “even ‘healthy’ banks can fail” when facing a run and why it
can be rational for depositors to run on a healthy bank).
33 See, e.g., Eduardo Dávila, Dissecting Fire Sales Externalities 10--12 (unpublished working paper) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining “collateral externality” created by fire sales “arises because
experts do not internalize that selling an additional unit of capital depresses the equilibrium price and,
consequently, reduces the borrowing capacity of other constrained experts”); Jeremy C. Stein, Governor,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, The Fire-Sales Problem and Securities Financing Transactions 3--4
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/stein20131004a.pdf
27
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The presence of a LOLR disrupts this vicious circle. Rather than selling illiquid assets, a
bank facing a run can now use those assets as collateral for a loan from the central bank and
thus obtain the liquidity needed to satisfy depositor demands.34 Moreover, the mere presence of
a LOLR can reduce the tendency of depositors to run, as they now have no reason to fear that an
otherwise healthy bank might be rendered insolvent should other depositors demand their
money back.35
The dramatic changes in the financial markets over the past thirty years have
complicated even this updated depiction of the LOLR’s function. One reason is that market and
regulatory innovations have cast doubt on whether the Fed should continue to provide LOLR
support to individual institutions. There is now a robust interbank lending market and other
financial innovations, like repurchase agreements (repos), which typically enable banks with
appropriate collateral to quickly and cheaply obtain new funding. 36In the presence of such
market mechanisms, liquidity injected through OMO should be redistributed to the banks or
other institutions most in need of it, assuming they are healthy or have appropriate collateral.37

[http://perma.cc/9HTS-JS6W] (describing harm fire sales inflict upon third parties as decreases in
collateral value of security exacerbate financing constraints); see also Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse
Heje Pedersen, Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2201, 2205 (2009) (showing
how funding liquidity and market liquidity shortages can reinforce and aggravate one another).
34 See Tucker, supra note 2, at 15 (“[B]y providing liquidity the central bank reduces the need for a forced
sale of assets that otherwrise would depress values . . . .”).
35 E.g., id. at 15 (“Ex ante, knowing that the LOLR is there, banks’ short-term creditors should be less
inclined to run.”); see also Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 32, 404, 416--18 (suggesting existence of
deposit insurance prevents runs and further positing LOLR presence can serve similar role).
36 See, e.g., Gara Afonso et al., Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis, 66
J. Fin. 1109, 1113 (2011) (“A repurchase agreement, or repo, is a financial contract that allows the use of a
security as collateral for a cash loan, mostly on an overnight basis . . . . The repo market is a large and
opaque over-the-counter market that exceeded $10 trillion in the United States in 2008 . . . .”); Viktoria
Baklanova, Adam Copeland, & Rebecca McCaughrin, Reference Guide to U.S. Repo and Securities
Lending Markets 4--21 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 740, Sept. 2015),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr740.pdf (explaining basic
mechanics of repo contracts and measuring current market size of U.S. repo market); Dennis Kuo et al.,
Identifying Term Interbank Loans from Fedwire Payments Data 6--8 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff
Report No. 603, Mar. 2013),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr603.pdf (providing
overview of function and importance of interbank lending market, which “consists of unsecured loans
made from one bank to another, or more broadly, from one financial institution to another”).
37 See, e.g., Mehrling, supra note 26, at 27 (“The way it was supposed to work is that the Fed would lend
freely to the [primary] dealers and arbitrage would do the rest.”). Deposit insurance similarly reduces the
need for a LOLR, as depositors have little reason to flee if they know the government will make them
whole. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation, 127 Q.J. Econ. 57, 84
(2012) (“[T]he government [could] try to stem the amount of socially costly fire sales that occur for a
given amount of short-term bank debt. This could be done with either deposit insurance or a lender-oflast-resort policy.” (emphasis omitted)).
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In light of these developments, some economists have argued that OMO should be the sole tool
that the Fed uses to respond to liquidity shortages.38
The second and related development has been the rise of the shadow banking system, a
complex array of market-based mechanisms and nonbank institutions that serve many of the
same economic functions traditionally played by banks.39 The Crisis revealed that the shadow
banking system can be subject to runs just like banks and that runs on the shadow banking
system can similarly have adverse spillover effects on the health of real economy.40 The massive
scale of this system and its vulnerabilities also demonstrate the inevitable mismatch between
the scope of the Fed’s oversight authority and the domains in which systemic risk can build.
While the Fed’s oversight authority has been expanded post-Crisis, nothing in the Dodd-Frank
Act alters the general tendency for financial activity to move to less regulated domains.41
A.

The Crisis

Despite the questions about the need for a LOLR willing to provide liquidity through
mechanisms other than OMO in today’s markets, the Fed quickly took up the role of providing
more aggressive liquidity injections, to individual financial institutions, during the Crisis. When
the Fed first recognized that a lack of liquidity seemed to be adversely affecting market
functioning in August 2007, it responded by encouraging banks to make greater use of the
discount window, the only standing LOLR facility.42 When bank borrowing remained modest,
the Fed created the Term Auction Facility (TAF). The TAF was available only to banks
otherwise eligible to borrow through the discount window and it required comparable
collateral, but through its structure and lack of historical baggage, the TAF was designed to be

See Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last Resort: A Review of the Literature, 7 Fin. Stability Rev. 151, 157
(1999) (providing overview of literature supporting this view); see generally Mark A. Carlson & David C.
Wheelock, The Lender of Last Resort: Lessons from the Fed’s First 100 Years 36--38 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-065B, 2012) (describing “longstanding debate in academic and policy
forums concern[ing] how a lender of last resort should provide liquidity, and in particular whether the
lender of last resort should ever lend directly to individual financial institutions” and identifying the
major proponents on both sides).
39 Erik F. Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation 399--401 (2011); Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow
Banking (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 458, July 2010) 1--3 [hereinafter Pozsar et al.,
Shadow Banking], http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf; Judge, Information
Gaps, supra note 2, at 21--22.
40 Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. Fin. Econ. 425, 425-28 (2012).
41 Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 2, at 51 (arguing “regulations implementing provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act targeting the Shadow Banking system seem likely to fall short” of legislator’s goals for
reforming money market mutual funds).
42 The Discount Rate, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (last updated Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.
federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm [http://perma.cc/R6EZ-Y6CN] (providing more
detailed description of Fed’s standing facilities).
38
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free from the perceived stigma that many viewed as inhibiting utilization of the discount
window.43
When conditions in the financial markets got worse rather than better, the Fed expanded
its use of new facilities. In March 2008, around the time of Bear Stearns’ failure, the Fed
implemented two new facilities. These facilities were distinctive in that they provided liquidity
support directly to primary dealers---that is, the securities dealers with whom the Fed engages
in OMO, including all of the major investment banks---rather than regulated banks.44 To do so,
the Fed invoked its authority under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which enables the
Fed to provide liquidity to nonbanks under “unusual and exigent circumstances.”45 Like the
discount window, these facilities conferred benefits on the institutions eligible to borrow
through them even when those institutions did not use the facility, as counterparties had less
reason to be concerned about the capacity of an eligible institution to obtain liquidity if
needed.46
Following Lehman’s failure in September 2008, the Fed got even more aggressive,
creating four additional facilities to provide support to segments of the market that in the Fed’s
view were experiencing significant distress. For example, to help revive the securitization
market, the Fed created a facility that allowed users to borrow funds on a nonrecourse basis so
long as they provided the requisite collateral, qualifying AAA-rated asset-backed securities
(ABS).47 Similarly, to support the market for commercial paper---short-term debt used by a wide
variety of firms for liquidity management and other purposes---the Fed created a facility that
provided a liquidity backstop to U.S.-based issuers of commercial paper.48 The diversity of
facilities the Fed created illustrates the incredible flexibility of the Fed’s LOLR authority. The

E.g., Olivier Armantier et al., Discount Window Stigma During the 2007--2008 Financial Crisis, 118 J.
Fin. Econ. 317, 326 (2015) (empirically establishing banks were willing to pay more to borrow through
TAF than to borrow from discount window and thus “provid[ing] strong evidence of the existence of DW
stigma”); Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, The Federal Reserve and Financial Regulation: The First
Hundred Years (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19292, 2013),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19292 (providing historical overview of processes through which
discount window became stigmatized and identifying stigma as one of the major challenges Fed faced in
Crisis).
44 Office of the Inspector Gen., Fed. Reserve, The Federal Reserve’s Section 13(3) Lending Facilities to
Support Overall Market Liquidity: Function, Status, and Risk Management 31 (2010),
https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/FRS_Lending_Facilities_Report_final-11-23-10_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3BA-PL9E] [hereinafter Office of the Inspector Gen., Lending Facilities].
45 Id. at ii. Some of the programs actually relied upon an amalgam of the Fed’s powers, and hence had to
be approved by both the FOMC and the Board. See infra note ___.
46 Transcript of the Federal Open Market Committee Meeting on June 24--25, 2008, at 166 [hereinafter
June 24--25, 2008 FOMC Meeting] (Jeffrey M. Lacker, President and CEO of the Fed. Reserve Bank of
Richmond, explaining Lehman’s access to Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) materially altered
willingness of counterparties to continue to work with it).
47 Office of the Inspector Gen., Lending Facilities, supra note 44, at 105.
48 Id. at 69.
43
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Dodd-Frank Act imposes some new constraints on the Fed’s authority, primarily limiting its
ability to provide individualized support of the type used to bail out Bear Stearns and AIG, but
the flexibility otherwise remains intact.49
The key point to highlight, which comes out in richer detail in the Fed’s deliberations, is
that Fed policymakers were remarkably dynamic and creative along some dimensions, and yet
simultaneously remarkably constrained in their creativity and responsiveness along other
dimensions.50 More concretely, the Fed was exceptionally innovative in devising new ways to
facilitate the flow of liquidity to the shadow banking system and to protect the financial system
as it existed. At the same time, Fed policymakers remained largely tethered to the assumption
that the near-exclusive function of the Fed’s LOLR authority was to prevent insufficient
liquidity from harming the financial system despite signals that lack of information was a
significant and potentially greater factor inhibiting market functioning.51 Similarly, despite the
dramatic changes in the rationales for LOLR support and the nature of the financial system
since Bagehot’s time, Fed policymakers regularly and explicitly invoked Bagehot’s dictum to
explain the Fed’s actions.52 And, despite finding creative ways to provide significant liquidity
support to the shadow banking system,53 Fed policymakers regularly took cover in the
prevailing, and outdated, regulatory regime to deflect suggestions that they should bear any
meaningful responsibility for the financial health of the institutions populating that system.54
Given the structure of the Fed, it is not possible to draw any strong generalizations
about why “the Fed” was so responsive and innovative in some regards and so constrained in

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1101, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376, 2113 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)). The Dodd-Frank Act also left the Fed’s authority to
provide banks liquidity through the discount window and other facilities fully intact. Id.
50 See infra Part III [x-ref needs to be more specific].
51 See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Federal Reserve and the
Financial Crisis: Origins and Mission of the Federal Reserve (March 20, 2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/chairman-bernanke-lecture1-20120320.pdf (stating
“provision of liquidity” is “ main tool of central banks in dealing with financial panics or financial crises”
and asserting “providing short-term credit to financial institutions . . . can help calm the market, can help
stabilize those institutions, and can help mitigate or end a financial crisis”).
52 Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft Constraints, 78 Law & Contemp. Probs. 65, 79
(2015) [hereinafter Judge, Soft Constraints] (“During the recent Crisis, Bagehot’s name and [a] simplified
version of his dictum were invoked with great frequency by members of the Fed and outside
commentators.”).
53 See infra section III.D.
54 E.g., Morgan Ricks, Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation [pincite] (Columbia Law Sch. Law &
Econ. Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 370, 2010) [hereinafter Ricks, Shadow Banking],
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1571290 [http://perma.cc/2M9N-JTYC]
(explaining “at the height of the crisis, very nearly the entire emergency policy response was designed to
prevent shadow bank defaults through a series of ‘temporary’ and ‘extraordinary’ interventions”).
49
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others.55 A variety of factors likely contributed. Fed policymakers faced a genuine challenge.
The LOLR literature provided minimal guidance with respect to how the evolution of modern
financial systems may have changed the appropriate role of a LOLR, beyond the claims, quickly
belied by reality, that such changes mooted the need for a LOLR to provide support through
any mechanism beyond OMO.56 Fed policymakers may also have perceived that invoking
Bagehot’s dictum could provide both justification and a cover for the scope of the Fed’s
operations.57 Regardless of the rationales for the Fed’s actions during the Crisis, the very process
of identifying more effective ways for the Fed to deploy its control over liquidity to bring about
the timely resolution of a financial crisis could transform the Fed’s behavior in response to
future crises. If Fed officials failed to appreciate how they could most effectively use their
authority, then the insights gleaned from the analysis here could prompt officials to be more
responsive in the future. If Fed officials were constrained by concerns about the perceived
legitimacy of using their authority in the ways proposed, providing a new vision about how the
Fed ought to use this authority could empower Fed officials to take the actions they recognize
as needed to promote stability. And, if Fed officials failed to act in order to deflect responsibility
for troubled institutions and markets, this paper could spur Fed officials into action by making
it more likely that Congress and others will hold them to account should they fail to act when
the proposed paradigm suggests they could and should do so.
II.

LEVERAGE AS CREDITOR

This Part introduces the claim that the Fed should use its LOLR authority to further its
role as information coordination agent during periods of persistent systemic distress. It then
briefly shows how a central bank can determine that it is facing a persistent liquidity crisis and
how a central bank should shift its approach to using its LOLR authority once it makes that
determination. In order to allow the case study of the Crisis to animate the claim, the analysis
here is kept brief.58
A.

The Claim

This Essay argues that the Fed’s LOLR authority is a powerful tool and one that has
often been ineffectively utilized as a result of the near-exclusive focus on liquidity shortages as
an aggravator of systemic distress. Insufficient liquidity can have significant and adverse effects
on market functioning, so providing liquidity will always be among the aims a LOLR should

See infra Part III (providing overview of key decisionmaking bodies that collectively constitute the
Fed).
56 E.g., Tucker, supra note 2, at 10 (describing “relative neglect of LOLR in the core literature on central
banking over the past twenty years” and attributing this “tragedy,” which “contributed to central banks
losing their way” during Crisis, to fact that until Crisis, “LOLR was widely regarded as a relic of the
past”).
57 See Judge, Soft Constraints, supra note 52, at 81 (describing how “Bagehot’s dictum provides cover for
one of the most controversial aspects of the Fed’s actions during the Crisis---its extensive lending to
nonbank institutions---and was invoked by Fed policymakers to justify these actions”).
58 See infra Part V (providing more thorough analysis of counterarguments).
55
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seek to achieve. When a liquidity shortage is the byproduct of an exogenous shock, such as the
9/11 terrorist attacks or the dramatic one-day decline of the stock market known as Black
Monday, the current paradigm suggesting that the LOLR should flood the market for liquidity,
subject only to constraints relating to moral hazard and credit risk, likely remains optimal.59
Under such conditions, liquidity alone should suffice to restore stability and the disruptions to
market functioning should be inherently finite so long as a central bank provides the requisite
support.60 But not all liquidity shortages fit this mold.61
During the Crisis and other periods of financial distress, liquidity shortages have
persisted despite aggressive efforts by the Fed to inject new liquidity into the market.62 When
the ongoing provision of liquidity fails to quell a liquidity shortage, that persistence conveys
information. It reveals that the shortage is also symptom a signal that there are deeper ills
plaguing the financial system. Under these circumstances, the provision of liquidity alone will
never suffice to restore market functioning and could make the situation worse.
The notion that liquidity alone will not suffice to restore stability once lost is not a new
insight. For example, well over twenty years ago, Charles Calomiris and Gary Gorton showed
that once a panic takes hold, the provision of liquidity alone will not suffice to end a panic.63
Rather, in their analysis, once a panic takes hold, markets will resume healthy functioning only
after a credible source, such as the government or a clearinghouse, provides market participants

See, e.g., Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Systemic Risk and
the International Lender of Last Resort (Sept. 28, 2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20070928a.htm [http://perma.cc/4HB6VRWH] [hereinafter Mishkin, Remarks] (identifying these as two instances when Fed “acted successfully
to prevent potentially devastating financial seizures”).
60 See Kaufman, supra note 23, at 174--78 (analyzing effectiveness of LOLR support when facing certain
types of exogenous shocks).
61 While this paper is the first to argue that this distinction merits a prominent place in analyses of how
LOLRs should respond when facing liquidity shortages, others have recognized that liquidity shortages
can be grouped in this manner. Compare Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Meeting on Sept. 18,
2007, at 19 [hereinafter September 18, 2007 FOMC Meeting] (statement of Frederick S. Mishkin) (making
this distinction and identifying previous examples of each), with Frederic S. Mishkin, Economics of
Money, Banking, and Financial Markets 366--69 (10th ed. 2012) (discussing LOLR function without
making any reference to this distinction).
62 E.g., infra section II.B (showing Crisis followed this pattern); see also Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt.
Comm. on Aug. 5, 2008, at 90 (statement of Frederic Mishkin) (“Just as a reminder, remember that in the
Great Depression, when . . . something hit the fan, [laughter] it actually occurred close to a year after the
initial negative shock . . . . We are now a year into this.”).
63 Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank
Regulation, in Financial Markets and Financial Crises 107, 160-62 (R. Glenn Hubbard, ed., 1991).
59
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with the information about where the weaknesses lie.64 While much has changed in the financial
markets, this fundamental fact has not.65
The further possibility that the provision of liquidity can be counterproductive during
periods of prolonged market distress has been brought to life in recent work by a number of
leading economists. Gary Gorton, Andrew Metrick, and Lei Xie, for example, have
demonstrated that under such conditions, market participants tend to provide (and thus obtain)
funding through mechanisms with increasingly short maturities, thereby increasing the fragility
of the overall financial system and reducing its capacity to withstand further adverse
developments.66 Concretely, this means that one reason the ripple effects of Lehman Brothers’
failure in September 2008 were so crippling was that the overall financial system was
significantly more fragile than it had been when the Crisis started in August 2007. Similarly,
Viral Acharya and Bruce Tuckman have shown that traditional LOLR activities enable financial
institutions to delever at a slower rate than the market would otherwise require.67 This is good if
the problems are exogenous and the deleveraging inefficient, but, by rendering institutions
more fragile in the face of subsequent adverse shocks, this effect is quite troubling in the context
of a persistent liquidity shortage. There is thus a growing body of work that suggests that
during periods of prolonged distress, market participants change their activities in ways that
increase the fragility of the system. This alone provides a reason to rethink how a LOLR should
respond when facing a persistent liquidity shortage.
The second reason to rethink how a LOLR should use that authority when facing a
persistent liquidity shortage is that persistent liquidity shortages also give rise to new
opportunities. When liquidity is in short supply, the value of liquidity goes up, and so too does
the leverage the Fed enjoys by virtue of controlling access to liquidity. The Fed’s singular access
to unlimited liquidity thus becomes a far more potent tool right when the Fed needs it most.
Just as importantly, the site of liquidity shortages will often serve as a roadmap to the sectors of
the financial system that are facing problems that need to be addressed before stability can

Id.
See infra section II.____; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial
Crisis: It’s Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 Va. L. Rev. 313, 319 (2014) (“Increased mandatory
disclosure is the simplest response to market failure that turns on information costs. Disclosure was
inadequate within and across all markets implicated in the Crisis . . . .”).
66 Gary Gorton, Andrew Metrick & Lei Xie, The Flight from Maturity 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 20027, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20027.pdf [http://perma.cc/X3685TDS] (“argu[ing] that the financial system became increasingly fragile during the crisis, so that even a
small shock would have led to a large response at that point in the crisis) (italics in original).
67 E.g., Viral V. Acharya & Bruce Tuckman, Unintended Consequences of LOLR Facilities: The Case of
Illiquid Leverage, 14th Jacques Polk Annual Research Conference 3, 4 (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/viral.pdf [http://perma.cc/AG7VDL4M] (showing that one effect of access to a LOLR “is to give the bank leeway to reduce deleveraging
sales of illiquid assets” and explaining that “the facts of broker-dealer deleveraging are consistent with
the model of the paper: during a crisis, with security of LOLR facilities in place, broker-dealers delivered
relatively slowly, and the weaker among them delivered the most slowly”).
64
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return, the ultimate aim of the Fed’s LOLR authority. Through properly designed facilities, the
Fed can extract information and address problems right at their source, irrespective of the
prevailing, and typically outdated, regulatory regime. By drawing attention to these
opportunities and making an affirmative case for how the Fed can use its LOLR authority as
part of its role as “information coordination agent” during periods of systemic distress, this
Essay complements the recent work on the reasons that flooding the market with liquidity may
be problematic during such times.
The core claim is simple: The Fed ought to use the leverage that it enjoys by virtue of
controlling access to liquidity to acquire the information it needs to understand the magnitude
and contours of the underlying issues causing the market dysfunction to continue. It should
also use that leverage, in conjunction with its other sources of authority, to facilitate the
redistribution of information among market participants and other government actors in order
to bring about a timely resolution to the underlying issues that it discovers.68
Critically, the role of information coordination agent is not an entirely new one for the
Fed, nor is it one that would require any expansion of the Fed’s already vast authority. The Fed
has long been at the forefront of efforts to contain growing financial crises, and collecting and
coordinating the distribution of information have always been components of those efforts.
Collecting and coordinating the distribution of information was also a role the Fed often played,
albeit inconsistently, in the recent Crisis,69 and it is one that the Fed has played during other
episodes that threatened systemic stability. For example, when the possible failure of the hedge
fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) posed a threat to the stability of the financial
system in 1998, the New York Fed played a critical role in identifying and coordinating a
response to that threat.70 Consistent with the paradigm proposed here, the Fed operated in a
way that was agile and responsive to the source of the threat, even though the Fed has no
supervisory or other authority over hedge funds like LTCM,71 and it similarly lacked such
authority over the many investment banks that played a critical role in funding the bailout and
whom would have been harmed had LTCM failed.72 This ultimately enabled the Fed to

This is based on the notion that containing financial crises is a central role of central banks. See, e.g.,
Bernanke, supra note 51, at 4--5 (explaining one function of Fed is “to keep the financial system working
normally and, in particular . . . to either prevent or . . . mitigate financial panics or financial crises”).
69 See infra Part III.
70 See Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 105th Cong., 22--27 (1998)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System) (reporting on
“Federal Reserve’s role in facilitating private sector refinancing of the large hedge fund, Long Term
Capital Management”).
71 See Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management 186
(2000) (“Long-Term was not a bank, and the Fed does not have authority over hedge funds.”).
72 See id. at 214--18 (recounting LTCM rescue, which included investment banks such as Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch); Michael P. Malloy, 3 Banking Law and Regulation § 14.04[C], at 132--33
(2d. ed 2015) (noting Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs only became subject to Fed supervision in 2008
when they converted to Bank Holding Companies); Edward V. Murphy, Cong. Research Serv., R43087,
68
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coordinate an entirely private bailout of LTCM, eliminating the need for the government to
make difficult decisions about whether to become further involved in the debacle.73
While the Fed did not have to use any of its formal sources of authority in connection
with that debacle, its decision to play the critical role that it did in facilitating a smooth
resolution of LTCM illustrates the longstanding assumption by the Fed and others that the Fed
should play a central role in crisis management. The situation also illustrates the ways the Fed
has often and appropriately been quite creative in how it uses its formal and informal sources of
authority in executing that role.74
Despite this related incident and the role the Fed played communicating and
coordinating with Treasury and other officials during the Crisis, the Fed often failed to use its
LOLR authority as a mechanism for gathering information that would have been valuable to the
Fed, other policymakers, and market participants. Again, this may well reflect the lack of
theoretical support for such an approach, a legitimate desire by Fed officials not to overstep the
implicit limits on how they ought to use their vast authority, or a less legitimate desire to avoid
accountability by hewing to an outdated regulatory regime. The case study here reveals
moments that support all three conjectures. Regardless of the rationale or justification for such
behavior in the past, this work and the other post-Crisis research on the ramifications of the Fed
continuing to abide by outdated guidance in how it ought to deploy its LOLR authority during
periods of persistent systemic distress provide much needed guidance for how the Fed might
more effectively use this authority when facing the next financial crisis.
An important benefit of altering the Fed’s LOLR activities in the manner proposed is
that in addition to enhancing the Fed’s ability to contain a growing financial crisis, it also helps
mitigate the accountability issues that arise when the Fed uses this authority. Banks and other
financial institutions generally borrow from the Fed only in circumstances where the Fed is
providing more favorable terms (or more liquidity) than the institution can otherwise obtain.75
Additionally, mere access to Fed support can benefit eligible institutions even in the absence of
actual borrowing.76 Accurately perceiving that the financial institutions who receive such
support disproportionately benefit from it has animated much of the post-Crisis backlash

Who Regulates Whom and How? An Overview of U.S. Financial Regulatory Policy for Banking and
Security Markets 25--26 (2015) (explaining Fed had “no regulatory jurisdiction” over investment banks
pre-2008).
73 See generally Lowenstein, supra note 71 (providing detailed account of the episode).
74 See infra section V.B (discussing historical fuzziness among Fed’s instruments and aims).
75 Olivier Armantier, et al., Discount Window Stigma During the 2007--2008 Financial Crisis 18--21 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 483, Jan. 2011),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr483.pdf (showing that
financial institutions avoided borrowing from Fed’s discount window during 2008 crisis and were willing
to pay premium to borrow from alternative sources).
76 See, e.g., infra section III.D.i.
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against the Fed and has led many to call for its overall authority to be curtailed significantly.77
Some Fed policymakers had similar concerns about the fairness of the Fed’s actions and seemed
to want to be able to impose more of a quid pro quo on the Fed’s LOLR operations.78 Yet, there
are good reasons for the Fed not to demand economic recompense commensurate with the
value of the liquidity support it provides through LOLR facilities. Stigma often already
discourages borrowing and the Fed usually provides such support only when the overall
financial system would benefit from an institution’s willingness to take it.79 The proposed
approach is a way to balance these competing interests. By making informational and other
noneconomic demands in connection with the largesse of cheap liquidity, the Fed may be able
to mitigate concerns about legitimacy and fairness while enhancing (rather than undermining)
the Fed’s efforts to restore market functioning.80
B.
Identifying a Persistent Liquidity Shortage
A threshold challenge to the claim that a LOLR should revise how it uses that authority
when facing a persistent liquidity shortage is whether it is realistic to expect that central banks
will be able to recognize a shortage as persistent in real time. In practice, this potential challenge
is not all that challenging, as reflected in the evolution of the Crisis.
Despite the Fed’s myriad efforts to inject additional liquidity into the market starting in
August 2007, conditions remained strained throughout the period that followed. This was
evident from a number of indicia available in real time. For example, one important indicator of
liquidity conditions and bank health is the Libor--OIS spread, which is the difference between
the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) and the overnight indexed swap rate, a rate that
reflects market expectations of overnight rates over the term of the contract. Figure 1 shows the

E.g., Tucker, supra note 2, at 10 (observing “especially in the United States the atmosphere
[surrounding discussions regarding the appropriate role for a LOLR] is . . . toxic, poisoning debates about
central banking more generally”); Jeffrey M. Lacker, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, The Fed
as Lender of Last Resort: Comments on “Rules for a Lender of Last Resort” by Michael Bordo 1 (May 30,
2014), http://www.richmondfed.org/press_room/speeches/president_jeff_lacker/2014/pdf/lacker_
speech_20140530.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HVW-EQWS] (explaining that “[c]redit extension,” as LOLR,
“arguably has been the most problematic and contentious aspect of central banking, and it seems likely to
remain so for the foreseeable future”).
78 E.g., Transcript of the Federal Open Market Committee Conference Call on March 10, 2008, at 11
[hereinafter March 10, 2008 FOMC Conference Call] (Richard Fisher: “I can understand the carrot side of
this thing, and we are doing it for the reasons that you stated, and I am very sympathetic to the
argument. The question is, What do we get in return . . . .?”).
79 E.g., Armentier, et al., supra note 75, at 32--34 (finding “strong evidence of [discount window] stigma”);
Milton Friedman & Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867--1960, at 268-69 (1963) (arguing Fed should use “penalty rate” during normal times but not during times of crisis).
80 See also infra section IV.A (addressing concern that even proposed conditions might depress usage in
problematic ways).
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three-month Libor--OIS spread and the six-month Libor--OIS spread for the period from
January 2006 through September 2008:81
[Figure 1--attached]

Throughout this period, Fed policymakers regularly monitored these indicators and
understood that they showed that financial markets remained distressed.82 Fed policymakers

Notably, all of these measures likely understate the liquidity and credit challenges as a result of Libor
manipulation by reporting banks, and members of the FOMC were aware that this was likely. See, e.g.,
Transcript of the Federal Open Market Committee Meeting on April 29--30, 2008, at 5 [hereinafter April
29--30, 2008 FOMC Meeting] (William Dudley: “[t]here is considerable evidence that the official LIBOR
fixing understates the rates paid by many banks for funding”).
82 See, e.g., Rajdeep Sengupta & Yu Man Tam, The LIBOR-OIS Spread as a Summary Indicator, Econ.
Synopses, No. 25, 2008, https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/08/ES0825.pdf
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also regularly stated that the country was in the midst of a financial crisis that had started in
August 2007.83 And, as will be described in detail in Part III, they were aware that the Fed’s
myriad efforts to inject liquidity into the system had not had the desired aim of quelling the
ongoing market dysfunction.84 The trajectory of the Crisis thus illustrates how persistent
liquidity crises will reveal themselves and can be identified even without the benefit of
hindsight, enabling Fed policymakers to alter their response in the ways proposed.
C.

The Aims: Focusing on Information

Underlying this Essay’s claim that we should rethink how a central bank can best use its
LOLR authority when facing a persistent liquidity shortage is the recognition that today’s
financial markets look quite different than the markets of Bagehot’s day. In addition to being far
more complete than markets of yesteryear, today’s markets and institutions are also more
complex and dynamic. While the additional mechanisms for redistributing liquidity transform
the informational content of persistent liquidity shortfalls, the complexity and dynamism
increase the need for the information such signals now convey. These changes also transform
the role of the Fed and other regulators, as the dynamism of the system and the massive
information gaps that arise from the current regime increase the need for financial regulators to
be agile and responsive when facing indications that panic may be taking hold.85 Precisely
because this Essay is calling on the Fed to be agile and responsive in light of what it learns in the
moment, it is impossible to fashion a detailed roadmap in advance. Nonetheless, financial crises
follow patterns. Two key ingredients for a financial system to recover from a state of prolonged
distress are (1) regulators and market participants must have credible information about the
risks to which banks and other financial institutions are exposed86 and (2) those institutions
must have sufficient capital in light of those risks.87

[https://perma.cc/VFS3-GK79] (noting “[t]he LIBOR-OIS spread has been a closely watched barometer
of distress in money markets for more than a year”).
83 See, e.g., infra notes 153--157 and accompanying text (noting Fed policymakers during this period
recognized that state of economy resembled other major financial crises and they were concerned that
conditions might get worse).
84 See, e.g., infra notes 172--177, 207--211 and accompanying text (providing evidence of Fed’s awareness
of that the facilities they were using to inject liquidity had failed to fully quell the market dysfunction).
Just as importantly, this type of temporal delay is not unique to the Crisis. E.g., Transcript of the Fed.
Open Mkt. Comm. on Aug. 5, 2008, at 90 (statement of Frederic Mishkin) (“Just as a reminder, remember
that in the Great Depression, when . . . something hit the fan, [laughter] it actually occurred close to a year
after the initial negative shock . . . . We are now a year into this.”).
85 See Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 2, 26--40 (describing information gaps and their impact on
systemic stability).
86 See, e.g., Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 63, 124--27 (explaining that when “depositors are unable to
distinguish individual bank risks, they may withdraw a large volume of deposits from all banks [during a
panic] . . . .”).
87 See, e.g., Allen N. Berger et al., 19 J. Banking & Fin. 393, 424--25 (highlighting importance of capital
requirements in protecting government---the largest unsecured creditor of most U.S. banks---and in
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That financial stability depends on banks and other financial institutions having
sufficient capital in light of the risks to which they are exposed is reflected in the fact that capital
regulation was the cornerstone of early efforts to harmonize the regulation of banks in
advanced economies.88
The importance of high-quality information has just as long of a history, though it has
not received quite as much attention. Looking back, the inability of depositors to readily
distinguish healthy banks from weak ones has long been a factor contributing to the spread of
panics and bank runs.89 The growth of the shadow banking system, an intermediation regime
that is larger than the U.S. banking system and replicates the basic economic functions of banks,
alters the information dynamics that contribute to fragility, but by no means reduces the
importance of information.90 In other work, I show theoretically why information gaps are
likely to be large in the shadow banking system and how those information gaps inhibit market
functioning in certain states of the world.91 Given that the value of information is often state-

guarding economy against negatives externalities caused by bank failures); Daniel K. Tarullo, Capital
Regulation Across Financial Intermediaries (Sep. 28, 2015),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20150928a.htm (“In the wake of the crisis,
Basel III strengthened capital quality and levels across the board. In addition, capital surcharges were
imposed on about thirty banks of global systemic importance (G-SIBs) . . . .”); Daniel K. Tarullo,
Regulatory Reform Since the Financial Crisis (May 2, 2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20120502a.htm (discussing role of capital
requirements in post-Crisis regulatory reform and noting “they are central to good financial regulation,
precisely because they are available to absorb all kinds of potential losses, unanticipated as well as
anticipated”).
88 Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 13, at 29, 219--21 (“[During the 1980s,] U.S. regulators worked with
their foreign counterparts to develop risk-based capital standards . . . through the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision . . . . The Basel I Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, promulgated in 1988, set forth
requirements for minimum capital relative to a risk-adjusted measure of assets.”).
89 See, e.g., Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 63, 124--27 (explaining that when “depositors are unable to
distinguish individual bank risks, they may withdraw a large volume of deposits from all banks [during a
panic] . . . .”); ; Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 13, at 216--18 (“Well-capitalized banks are less likely
to falter than poorly capitalized banks. Thus capital requirements help protect depositors, other creditors,
the FDIC, and the financial system.”).
90 See Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 2, at 30--33 (describing the different ways that information can
facilitate and impede market functioning and how those dynamics can be state contingent); see also
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 65, at 331--50 (exploring role of information costs played as a type of
“market friction” in the Crisis); Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, 1.A Financial Intermediation, in
Handbook of the Economics of Finance 431, 505 (George M. Constantinides et al., eds., 2003) (providing
an information-based theory of panics).
91 See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic
Risk, 64 Stan. L. Rev 657, 690--97 (2012) [hereinafter Judge, Fragmentation Nodes] (arguing information
gaps in securitization process may alter behavior of market participants in ways that exacerbate systemic
risk); Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 2, at 24--25, 33--41 (explaining means by which information
gaps expand in shadow banking system); Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 Eur. Fin. Mgmt. 1, 11
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contingent and that information is costly to produce, ramping up information production in
certain states of the world will often be an optimal regulatory strategy.92 Just as importantly, it
will often be necessary regardless of whether optimal or not because market participants lack
the incentives and regulators lack the authority and resources to generate all of the information
that might be pertinent in all of the states of the world that could come to be.93
As the remainder of this section conveys in greater detail and Part III brings to life,
information production and redistribution are critical to the success of any effort aimed at crisis
containment. Extracting information and producing information, providing market participants
with the credible information they require to resume working directly with one another, and
identifying capital shortfalls in a timely fashion are thus the three aims that are the focus here
and are among the core aims that the Fed will want to pursue when using the leverage it enjoys
as the LOLR in the face of persistent liquidity shortages.
i.
Extracting Information. --- When liquidity problems persist, the first priority for
any central bank should be to understand why those problems are persisting. The importance of
the Fed having timely access to information about the health of financial institutions and
markets and the distribution of risks is well recognized and is a primary justification for the
Fed’s significant oversight authority.94 Nonetheless, the Fed’s supervisory authority will almost
inevitably be insufficient to enable the Fed to gather the information that it needs. This is in part
because when the Fed is acting as a supervisor, its primary function historically has been
microprudental--- i.e., focused on the financial health and risk exposures of individual
institutions with the aim of reducing the likelihood that any single firm will fail.95 During a
period of systemic distress, however, the information that will be most valuable to the Fed often
will be macroprudential in nature--- i.e., focused on matters that affect the stability of the overall

(2009) (noting shadow banking claims are not traded in markets resembling those economists tend to
focus on).
92 Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 2, at 49, 54--56 (pointing to “important role that more robust
disclosure policies could play in limiting information gaps and the fragility that results”).
93 See id. at 8--19 (contrasting information-related incentives of money claimants with those of equity
claimants); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It’s
Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 Va. L. Rev. 313, 331--50 (2014) (arguing costs of obtaining
information on timing of housing bubble burst and consequences of housing price decline kept
information from reaching market and contributed to crisis).
94 See, e.g., Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Central Banks’ Role in Bank Supervision in the United States and
United Kingdom, 28 Brook. J. Int’l L. 411, 432 (2003) (“Close relationships with banks will assist the
central bank in anticipating the direction of the economy and in addressing financial crises.”).
95 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the 47th Annual
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to
Supervision and Regulation (May 5, 2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110505a.htm (explaining that “the
traditional, or "microprudential," approach to regulation and supervision, . . . is concerned primarily with
the safety and soundness of individual institutions, markets, or infrastructures”).
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financial system, such as how exposures to a particular risk are distributed across market
participants or the nature and size of interconnections among different institutions and markets.
Another limitation is that the supervisory scheme is highly fragmented and will
inevitably be incomplete and backwards looking. Even with the post-Crisis reforms, the
regulatory regime in the United States remains highly fragmented. There are three separate
bank regulators and a wide array of important financial firms and markets that are overseen by
nonbank regulators, like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).96 Insurance regulation,
meanwhile, remains largely state-based.97 The Dodd-Frank Act makes important progress on
reducing the communication and coordination problems that arise from this dispersion of
authority through the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).98 Under the
leadership of the Treasury Secretary, the FSOC’s membership includes all of the leading federal
financial regulators and representatives from state regulators,99 and the Dodd-Frank Act allows
the FSOC to designate nonbanks as systemically significant and thereby subject those firms to
Fed oversight.100 The Dodd-Frank Act also created the Office of Financial Research (OFR) to
support the FSOC’s operations and the OFR has broad information-gathering authority.101
These changes mitigate some of the specific information problems that arose during the
Crisis.102 When facing the next financial crisis, the OFR should be an important ally for the Fed
in its efforts to gather pertinent information. And the FSOC should serve as an important body
through which the Fed can more effectively disseminate relevant insights to other financial
regulators and work with those regulators to address deficiencies outside the Fed’s domain.
Nonetheless, these changes by no means alleviate the core information and coordination issues
that arise from the dispersion of authority among so many different regulators, and hence the
importance of having one powerful and agile body play a lead role identifying such threats.
Just as relevant as the failure of the Dodd-Frank Act to fundamentally reform the
fragmented regulatory regime is the inability---and hence failure---of the Act to alter the
historical pattern that the very process of implementing financial regulations causes activity to

See Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 13, at 60--65 (enumerating bank and nonbank regulators).
Id. at 570.
98 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111, 124 Stat.
1376, 1392--94 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5343--5344 (2012)) (establishing FSOC).
99 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b) (2012) (identifying FSOC members).
100 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2012) (“The Council . . . may determine that a U.S. nonbank financial company
shall be supervised by the Board of Governors and shall be subject to prudential standards . . . if the
Council determines that material financial distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company . . . could pose
a threat to the financial stability of the United States.”).
101 See §§ 152--153, 124 Stat. at 1413--15 (establishing OFR and authorizing it to “sponsor and conduct
research projects” and to “share data and information . . . with the [FSOC]”).
102 See Ben S. Bernanke, Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation (May
5, 2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110505a.htm
[http://perma.cc/XH42-R3JK] (“[The OFR’s] collection and analysis of financial-sector data should allow
regulators to see more of the financial landscape and better equip them to identify systemic risks and
other emerging threats.”).
96
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move to less regulated domains.103 A leading example, and one that poses fundamental and still
unaddressed informational challenges, is the rise of the shadow banking system. The shadow
banking system is a capital-markets-based intermediation regime that serves many of the
functions traditionally filled only by banks. This system was central to the Crisis and a primary
beneficiary of the Fed’s LOLR operations.104 Moreover, while this system shrank immediately
following the Crisis, it regained its status as equal in size to the U.S. banking system and it is
poised for yet further growth.105
Information, or rather lack of it, is central to the systemic risk that arises from shadow
banking. A core regulatory challenge posed by shadow banking is the rise of information gaps--that is, pockets of pertinent and theoretically knowable information not known to any market
participant or regulator.106 Information gaps are endemic to shadow banking because a
significant portion of the capital flowing into the shadow banking system comes from the
issuance of money-like claims that are designed to obviate the need for the holder to do any
meaningful due diligence about the value of the underlying assets or the associated risks.107 At
the same time, because this regime operates in the capital markets and thus outside the direct
purview of the Fed and other prudential regulators, regulators often know even less than
market participants about matters like the quality of the underlying assets and how the
institutional arrangements that constitute the system redistribute risks and create new
interconnections. The close examination of the first year of the Crisis provides additional
evidence of these dynamics and the ways that information gaps can inhibit both the market and
regulatory responses required to help restore stability once panic takes hold.108 It also highlights
why the Fed and other regulators will always have an incomplete understanding of how risks
are allocated and the transmission mechanisms through which problems can spread, as the very
process of regulating creates new incentives for market participants to find new ways to
undertake economically equivalent activity in less regulated domains.109

See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 227, 243--44 (2010) (defining
conditions creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage).
104 See, e.g., Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Fed. Res. Bd. Of Governors, Some Reflections on
the Crisis and the Policy Response (Apr. 13, 2012) (stating that “a number of the vulnerabilities” at the
heart of the crisis “were associated with the increased importance of the so-called shadow banking
system”); see also Part I.B (discussing Fed’s provision of liquidity to nonbanks during Crisis).
105 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking: Inaugural Address for the Inaugural
Symposium of the Review of Banking & Financial Law, 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 619, 620 (noting
“shadow banking has . . . grown rapidly” between 2008 and 2011); Fin. Stability Bd., Global Shadow
Banking Monitoring Report 2014 8--9 (2014) (reporting shadow banking assets as share of GDP rose by “6
percentage points to 120% of GDP in 2013, approaching the peak of 124% of GDP in 2007”).
106 See Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 2, at 5--6 (describing why information gaps are endemic to
shadow banking as currently constituted).
107 Id.
108 See infra Part III (providing numerous examples of how lack of information inhibited market
functioning and capacity of regulators to respond in timely and appropriate way as events unfolded).
109 See Tucker, supra note 2, at 10, 17 (noting “regulatory arbitrage is endemic” to modern societies).
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In short, in both the United States and abroad, central banks have always played a lead
role in crisis management. Even post-Crisis, the Fed retains complete control over monetary
policy, which is often the most powerful tool available to combat a growing financial crisis.110
The Fed alone also retains control over the provision of liquidity, the other primary tool
traditionally used to prevent and contain financial crises.111 And other elements of the DoddFrank Act, like Congress’s decision to have the Fed oversee nonbank systemically-important
institutions, affirm the expectation that the Fed will continue to play a lead role addressing
systemic threats.112 The creation of the FSOC and the OFR alter the overall landscape in material
ways, and Fed policymakers will need to work closely with both organizations in the course of
their efforts to contain future financial crises. Nonetheless, the Fed remains at the forefront of
crisis management, and crisis management requires high-quality information that the Fed will
often lack when a crisis first strikes. Updating the paradigm for how the Fed can best use its
LOLR authority and expecting the Fed to serve as an information coordination agent during
periods of systemic distress will enable the Fed to execute its established roles more effectively
than it currently does and enhance the capacity of the overall financial regulatory regime to
contain nascent financial crises.
The final point to highlight is that in arguing that the Fed should at times extract
information from banks and other financial institutions in exchange for the largesse of timely
access to cheap liquidity, this Essay embraces a very thick notion of information generation.
This can go beyond demand data, to asking market participants to produce information they
might not otherwise possess and potentially even seconding personnel to the Fed to enhance
the Fed’s ability to analyze the information it has received. Given that part of the challenge will
be that relevant information is dispersed across market participants and regulators in ways that
inhibit anyone from having the comprehensive view necessary to make informed decisions, the
claim here is that the Fed should prioritize both information extraction and production as
among the aims it can legitimately seek to achieve using its LOLR authority.
ii. Information Injections. --- Information is just as important to market participants
as it is to regulators. Market participants rationally hesitate to enter into a transaction when they
lack information about the creditworthiness of counterparties, the value of collateral, or other
considerations relevant to the amount and nature of the risk that the transaction poses and the
terms of the transaction do not compensate them accordingly. These dynamics play a
significant role in contributing to systemic risk. Bad news signaling that missing information

E.g., Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan, Illiquid Banks, Financial Stability, and Interest
Rate Policy, 120 J. Pol. Econ. 552, 583 (2012) (“show[ing] why the structure of banks may necessitate ex
post interest rate intervention”).
111 See supra notes ___--___ and accompanying text.
112 See generally Ben S. Bernanke, The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis 3 (2013) (stating that a key
function of Fed is “to keep the financial system working normally and, in particular[] . . . to either prevent
or mitigate financial panics or financial crises”).
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may be important is often the immediate trigger of a financial crisis.113 This is just as true in the
shadow banking system as it is in the banking system.114 While market participants generally,
and money claimants in particular, may be quite comfortable relying on imperfect but probative
indicia of asset quality and related matters during periods of widespread confidence, that
inclination can change quickly in the face of any indication that the proxies market participants
had relied on are less reliable than previously believed.115
Put differently, a lack of liquidity will often serve as a flag that market participants are
unwilling to trade because they lack the information they need to understand and price the
risks to which they will be exposed. Depending on their incentives and how costly it is for them
to privately produce that information, ignorance on the part of market participants can serve as
a major impediment to the restoration of healthy market functioning once confidence wanes.116
Additionally, injecting information or otherwise helping to coordinate the production and
redistribution of information to address such challenges may entail significantly less credit risk
and moral hazard than other government interventions to help restore stability, while still
helping to promote that aim. Helping market participants to produce pertinent information and
overcome frictions is thus a one way that the Fed can fulfill its role as information coordination
agent and help restore stability during periods of systemic distress.
iii. Bank Health. --- Another common reason for persistent liquidity problems is that
banks or other financial institutions lack sufficient capital in light of the risks to which they are
exposed. Liquidity shortages only arise when market participants are hesitant to work with one
another or hesitant to accept collateral on terms equivalent to those they had previously been
willing to offer. Information-related frictions can aggravate and give rise to such problems. But
when market participants remain hesitant, it will often indicate that they have legitimate
concerns about the health of other financial institutions or the value of the collateral they can
post. Given the inherent staleness of the measures regulators typically use to monitor bank
health, these indications are ones that the Fed and other regulators should take seriously. And

See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton, Stress for Success 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2487195 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(contending we can understand financial crises as situations “where conditional on a public shock . . .
debt [which had been information insensitive] becomes information-sensitive,” giving rise to “adverse
selection or the fear of adverse selection”); see also Mishkin, Remarks, supra note 59 (defining systemic
risk as “ risk of a sudden, usually unexpected, disruption of information flows in financial markets that
prevents them from channeling funds to those who have the most productive profit opportunities”).
114 See e.g., Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 2, at 41—45 and sources cited therein (discussing
evidence of mass exits by money claimants in shadow banking system during Crisis, which occurred
when “bad news was coupled with new information suggesting that the proxies money claimants had
relied on were less accurate than previously believed”).
115 See Judge, Fragmentation Nodes, supra note 91, at 697 (“When a signal conveys new information
suggesting that an investor has dramatically underappreciated the nature or magnitude of a risk to which
he is exposed . . . the investor is likely to exercise significantly greater caution in assessing and taking
actions in respose to other possible risks as well.”).
116 See id. at 33--36 (____________).
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because the Fed’s role as the LOLR means it will likely end up exposed to precisely those
financial institutions and collateral that the market is questioning, regardless of whether the Fed
otherwise oversees those institutions, the Fed ought to be at the forefront of efforts to identify
capital shortfalls and other financial weaknesses.
History has shown that bank regulators and other government actors often delay
acknowledging and addressing weaknesses in the health of financial institutions, and that such
delays typically cause the situation to deteriorate further and often increase the cost of the
ultimate cleanup.117 The Fed’s LOLR authority is not the optimal tool for addressing capital
weaknesses. Once the Fed identifies areas of concern, it will often need to work with the FSOC,
other regulators, or Congress to gather further information and address any identified capital
deficiencies. Failures to correct shortfalls thus cannot and should not be laid entirely at the Fed’s
door. Nonetheless, identifying capital shortfalls and working with other policymakers as
needed to address those shortfalls in a timely fashion is entirely consistent with roles that the
Fed has long played and remains uniquely well suited to play.
III.

THE CRISIS

For the sake of analysis, the Crisis can be divided into four chapters: (1) the buildup; (2)
the slow decline; (3) life support; and (4) recovery. During the buildup, the period leading up to
August 2007, the groundwork for the Crisis was laid: housing prices soared; subprime loans
proliferated; securitization vehicles, backed by subprime loans and other assets, flourished;
other elements of the shadow banking system similarly grew; and financial institutions became
increasingly leveraged and increasingly reliant on wholesale financing. There was increasing
evidence of problems in the housing market and declining demand for mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) starting in 2006. Nonetheless, it was not until August 2007,118 when BNP
Paribas announced that it was halting redemptions in three funds because a lack of liquidity
prevented it from being able to accurately price certain MBS in those funds, that systematic
ramifications of these developments were on full display. The period from August 2007 through
September 2008 marked the slow decline. Immediately following the failure of Lehman
Brothers, starting with the government’s provision of $85 billion for insurance giant AIG, was
the period of life support. In the months that followed, the government effectively backstopped
every critical element of the banking and shadow banking system.119 To do this, regulators

The savings and loan debacle is the most famous example of these phenomena, but the analysis here
reveals that similar dynamics were at play during the Crisis.
118 See The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong.
147 (2007) (statement of Vickie A. Tillman, Executive Vice President, Standard & Poor’s Credit Market
Services).
119 See Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, supra note 39, at 2 (noting emergency liquidity facilities “amounted
to functional backstops of . . . the [entire] credit intermediation process that runs through the shadow
banking system . . . [w]hile today’s traditional banking system was made safe and stable through the
deposit insurance and liquidity provision provided by the public sector”).
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became increasingly creative in how they used the powers available to them,120 sought
additional authority from Congress,121 and then became even more creative and aggressive in
how they used their expanded authority.122 This stabilized markets, but it did so primarily by
allowing market participants to rely on the creditworthiness of the government in lieu of frank
assessments of counterparty risk and asset values. This period gradually transitioned into the
final chapter, a period of recovery during which market participants became increasingly
willing to work with one another directly and the financial system regained its capacity to
function without widespread government support.
Each period of the Crisis, from the buildup to the recovery, is potentially relevant to this
project. The types of life support required, for example, reveal systemic fragilities that
potentially could have been identified and treated earlier. Similarly, the conditions that enabled
life support to be withdrawn shed light on the types of government interventions that proved
most enduring. Yet, accounts of the Crisis are frequently hundreds of pages long, and even then
are truncated versions of all that occurred.123 A comprehensive analysis is thus beyond the
scope of this Essay.
This Part addresses the space constraints in a few ways. First, the analysis proceeds
chronologically, but its focus is on the slow decline, that is, after the crisis was underway but
before the disastrous events of September 2008. Second, the analysis focuses on episodes that
are particularly important or illustrative with respect to the dynamics here at issue. Within
these episodes, the analysis is structured in accordance with the aims of information gathering,
information dissemination, and assessing bank health. The aim is to consider whether, in light
of what Fed officials knew at various junctures, they might have made different decisions had
their actions been guided by the proposed paradigm for how a LOLR should respond during
periods of prolonged market dysfunction.

See infra section III.D.ii (discussing Fed tactics in handling AIG crisis).
Housing and Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § ___, 122 Stat. 2654, 2734 (2008) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2012)) (providing Treasury Secretary with power to place GSEs into receivership or
conservatorship); Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §___, 122 Stat. 3765, 3780
(2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5225 (2012)) (providing Treasury Secretary with authority to acquire up to
$700 billion of distressed assets).
122 For example, preferred shares in relatively healthy banks and unhealthy automakers were deemed to
be “troubled assets,” and thus could be acquired using funds that Congress had made available based on
the expectation they would be used to buy MBS and other “toxic” assets. Neil King Jr. & John D. Stoll,
U.S. Offers $5 Billion to Car Suppliers, Wall St. J. (Mar. 20, 2009, 120:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB123747406976485103 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
123 E.g., Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011) (spanning 633 pages);
Timothy F. Geithner, Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises (2014) (spanning 580 pages); Henry M.
Paulson, Jr., On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System (2011)
(spanning 512 pages); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and
Washington Fought to Save the Financial System---and Themselves (2010) (spanning 600 pages).
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The third way the scope is rendered manageable is by focusing primarily on the lead up
to two of the most important developments in the Crisis: the failure of Lehman Brothers and the
Fed’s rescue of AIG. Lehman’s bankruptcy filing had massive ripple effects, triggering adverse
developments throughout the financial system, and has been identified by many as the most
significant regulatory failure of the Crisis.124 It thus played a critical role, accentuating the
magnitude of the Crisis and the Great Recession that followed. AIG’s near failure was critical.
As one commentator noted at the time, the initial $85 billion facility the Fed instituted to save
AIG was “the most radical intervention in private business in the central bank’s history.”125 The
implicit policy of too-big-to-fail reified by this action gave rise to significant moral hazard and
associated market distortions---shielding systemically important firms from market discipline,
enabling them to access funding on excessively favorable terms, and incenting financial
institutions to alter their profiles in ways that increase the likelihood that they too will be
perceived as too systemically significant to fail. It also led to a range of costly reforms designed
to counter this moral hazard.126 And, it exposed the Fed to significant credit risk, as Fed
policymakers had limited information about AIG’s financial health when they extended this
support.127 Hence, if the Fed, on its own or with the aid of other actors, could have done more to
avert or minimize the ramifications of either of these developments, the course of the Crisis, the
legislative response to it, and the amount of credit risk and moral hazard arising from the
government’s interventions might have been very different.
A final background note: Because the aim of this Part is to consider what was known or
realistically knowable by policymakers, it relies heavily on primary materials to reconstruct
these dynamics in real time. One limitation inherent in this approach is that the most
comprehensive contemporaneous materials consist of transcripts of FOMC meetings.
Composed of all members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (the Board) and five
presidents of regional reserve banks, the FOMC is primarily responsible for setting monetary
policy and overseeing OMOs whereas the Board and regional banks play a greater role in
establishing and implementing LOLR operations. Nonetheless, the transcripts remain highly

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy 274 (2010) (“decid[ing] to allow
Lehman to slip into bankruptcy . . . looms as the single biggest blunder” during the Crisis); Gorton, Stress
for Success, supra note 114, at 2) (“Clearly, the results of the Lehman bankruptcy were devastating.”). But
see David A. Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended)
Consequences 23--31 (2010) (suggesting Lehman’s failure was not as pivotal as some suggest).
125 Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced & Mary Williams Walsh, Fed’s $85 Billion Loan Rescues
Insurer, N.Y. Times (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/business/17insure.html?hp
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
126 See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-14-809T, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts.
& Consumer Prot. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, Large Bank Holding Companies:
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and Community Investment, U.S. Government Accountability Office) (2014) (stating empirical analysis
and interviews suggest “recent regulatory reforms have reduced but not eliminated the likelihood the
federal government would prevent the failure of one of the largest bank holding companies”).
127 See infra section III.D.ii.
124

30

relevant, as financial stability is critical to the FOMC’s capacity to fulfill its mandate and the
transcripts provide valuable insights into the understandings and perceptions of FOMC
members, which also informed the actions they took as members of the Board and presidents.
A.

August 2007: The Sstart

The event that precipitated the start of the Crisis was the announcement by BNP Paribas
that it was suspending redemptions in three of its funds because the lack of liquidity in the
market for subprime MBS prevented it from being able to value the assets the funds held--precipitated the start of the Crisis.128 The market contraction that followed was sufficiently

See Mark Jickling, Cong. Research Serv., R40173, Causes of the Financial Crisis (2010) (“The current
financial crisis began in August 2007 . . . .”); Gara Afonso, Anna Kovner & Antoinette Schoar, Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Rep. No. 437, Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial
Crisis 2--3, 9 (2010) (revised 2011) (finding liquidity hoarding beginning after August 2007 and referring
to “2007-2008 Crisis”); Alan S. Blinder, After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response, and
the Work Ahead 90 (2013) (“The system began to crack in July 2007” but “[t]he real wake-up call didn’t
come until August 9, 2007 . . . .”); Michael J. Fleming, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Rep. No. 563,
Federal Reserve Liquidity Provision During the Financial Crisis of 2007--2009, at 1 (2012) (“The Federal
Reserve . . . undertook numerous measures to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis that started in
August 2007.”); Paulson, supra note 123, at 61 (“The crisis in the financial markets I had anticipated hit
with force on August 9, 2007.”); Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, supra note 39, at 59 (noting “ liquidity
crisis began in August 2007”); Viral V. Acharya & Matthew P. Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis,
21 Critical Rev. 195, 208 (2009) (describing BNP Paribas announcement on August 9, 2007 as “next wave
of the crisis”); Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007--2008, 23 J.
Econ. Pers. 77, 82--86 (describing troubling indicators throughout summer of 2007 and shift that followed
BNP’s announcement); Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J.
Fin. Econ. 425, 426 (2012) (referring to “financial crisis that began in August 2007”); Alberto Manconi,
Massimo Massa & Ayako Yasuda, The Role of Institutional Investors in Propagating the Crisis of 20072008, 104 J. Fin. Econ. 491, 491 (2012) (“By August 2007, what had begun as some bad news about the
souring of the subprime mortgage market had spread into a full-fledged financial crisis encompassing
wide-ranging and seemingly unrelated markets.”); Jill Treanor, Credit Crunch Pinpointed to 9 August
2007---The Day the World Changed, Guardian (Dec. 1, 2011, 3:49 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/dec/01/credit-crunch-pinpointed-august-2007
[http://perma.cc/CG4L-2DG7] (pinpointing “start of the first credit crunch as 9 August 2007”); Unhappy
Birthday, Economist (Aug. 9, 2012, 1:40 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/08/financial-crisis [http://perma.cc/P638-B7X2]
(“There is a debate to be had over when precisely the financial crisis began. But five years ago today, on
August 9th 2007, is the strongest candidate.”); Alexander Chudik & Marcel Fratzscher, Liquidity, Risk
and Global Transmission of the 2007--08 Financial Crisis and the 2010--11 Sovereign Debt Crisis __(Fed.
Reserve Bank of Dall., Working Paper No. 107, 2012),
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severe that the European Central Bank (the ECB) immediately injected an additional 95 billion
Euro into the financial system. Soon thereafter, the ECB made additional liquidity injections and
other central banks, including the Fed, intervened to support market functioning.129 The August
and September meetings of the FOMC address these developments and what Fed policymakers
learned from them.
i.
Extracting Information. --- Within a week of the BNP Paribas announcement, Fed
Chairman Ben Bernanke recognized that the dysfunction observable in the markets could
trigger a “downward spiral . . . that could threaten or harm the economy” and that the Fed
should respond accordingly. 130 As Bernanke noted, the possible responses consisted of
“something in monetary policy, something in our lender-of-last-resort function, or some
combination.”131 After debating the options, the FOMC decided to bolster its LOLR operations
by making loans extended through the discount window more attractive to banks.132 The
Committee favored such an approach because lowering the fed funds rate---the primary tool for
monetary policy---was viewed as a “blunter instrument.”133
By September, most Fed policymakers recognized that the previous month had revealed
significant weaknesses in the financial markets, and many also believed that the possibility of

[https://perma.cc/NNV2-967Z] (“Lehman was going to extraordinary efforts . . . to hide its leverage,
even after the financial crisis started in August 2007.”). The transcripts from the FOMC meeting on
August 7, 2007 reveal that Fed policymakers were attuned to liquidity shortages in these markets and the
potential for those shortages to disrupt the functioning of key markets. Transcript of the Federal Open
Market Committee Meeting on August 7, 2007, at 16--17 [hereinafter August 7, 2007 FOMC Meeting]
(statement of William Dudley). Nonetheless, the BNP Paribas announcement and the market disruptions
that followed provided regulators and market participants significant new information about the
magnitude of the disruptions that could result.
129 See, e.g., Mauro F. Guillen, Lauder Inst., Wharton Sch., Univ. of Pa., The Global Economic & Financial
Crisis: A Timeline 1, http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Chronology_Economic_Financial_Crisis.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2015)
(“Thursday, August 9, 2007: . . . The European Central Bank pumps €95bn (£63bn) into the banking
market to try to improve liquidity. It adds a further €108.7bn over the next few days. The US Federal
Reserve, the Bank of Canada and the Bank of Japan also begin to
intervene.”).
130 Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Conference Call on Aug. 16, 2007, at 3 (statement of Ben
Bernanke), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20070816confcall.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3MH5-MPRH] [hereinafter August 16, 2007 FOMC Conference Call].
131 Id. at 7 (statement of Ben Bernanke).
132 See September 18, 2007 FOMC Meeting, supra note 61.
133 See August 16, 2007 FOMC Conference Call, supra note 130, at 28 (statement of Richard Fisher); see
also id. at 6 (statement of Ben Bernanke) (noting “rate cut is not completely off the table, but my own
feeling is that we should try to resist a rate cut until it is really very clear from economic data and other
information that it is needed”).
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an extremely bad outcome had increased.134 According to Governor Frederic Mishkin, “[T]he
downside risk is actually very, very substantial. Though we may not be allowed to mention it in
public, we have to mention the ‘R’ word because there is now a significant probability of
recession.”135 Fed President Janet Yellen similarly expressed “concern[] about the asymmetric
nature of the risks that we face and the possibility of . . . nonlinear, negative dynamics.”136
Fed policymakers had also become attuned to the possibility that seemingly minor
developments could have significant and surprising effects. As Governor Kroszner noted: “We
saw that what really initiated things . . . was BNP Paribas’s announcement. . . . [I]t would have
been hard to know that it would have the kind of effect that it seemed to have of leading to a
revaluation of risks not just in the subprime sector but much more broadly.”137 He also
specifically recognized that because of changes in the financial markets, the Fed lacked critical
information:
In the old days, we used to know where the risks were; unfortunately, we knew
that they were all on the bank balance sheets. With the originate-to-distribute
model and securitizations, we have been able to move to a different model in
which the risks are much more dispersed. . . . [S]ome of them are certainly going
to be coming onto the bank balance sheets, so the banks never fully get out of
this. But it leads to potential pockets of uncertainty, and that is exactly what has
come up.138
Yet, Fed policymakers seemed reluctant to use the Fed’s LOLR authority to inquire into the
actual health of financial institutions. For example, in explaining why he favored a more modest
reduction in the interest rate for discount window loans, Governor Donald Kohn explained that
such an approach would “help[] [the Fed] maintain” the status of the discount window as a “no
questions asked” facility, that is, as a facility that qualifying banks could access without having
their financial health scrutinized.139 And, in his view, it was “really important to maintain” that
policy.140
ii. Disseminating Information. --- Even prior to the BNP announcement, Fed
policymakers were aware that the markets for subprime mortgages and securities backed by
them were “significantly impaired.”141 Fed policymakers were also aware that the problems in

See, e.g., September 18, 2007 FOMC Meeting, supra note 61, at 83 (statement of Randall Kroszner) “I
agree with virtually everyone around the table that some of the downside risks have increased, and it’s
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135 Id. at 90 (statement of Frederic Mishkin). All titles refer to the position held at the time the words were
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136 Id. at 112 (statement of Janet Yellen).
137 Id. at 83--84 (statement of Randall Kroszner).
138 Id. at 86 (statement of Randall Kroszner).
139 August 16, 2007 FOMC Conference Call, supra note 130, at 12 (statement of Donald Kohn).
140 Id. at 26 (statement of Donald Kohn).
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the subprime market were adversely affecting corporate debt markets despite “the disparity in
fundamentals between these two sectors.”142 As William Dudley, who oversaw the Fed’s OMO,
explained to the Committee, the primary factor that seemed to be driving this unexpected
contagion was that “[t]here has been a loss of confidence among investors in their ability to
assess the value of and risks associated with structured products, which has led to a sharp drop
in demand for such products.”143
By September, the market appeared to be in the grips of a process of trying to reevaluate the risks associated with a wide variety of structured assets and the exposures of
financial institutions to those assets. As Timothy Geithner, President of the New York Fed and
Vice President of the Committee, explained: “The process of differentiation among strong and
weak institutions, conduits, financing vehicles, et cetera has to continue. But as many of you
said, this process could take quite some time, and it will leave us with the risk of a fair amount
of fragility in markets in the interim.”144 Kohn echoed these sentiments, noting that “[a] critical
channel of contagion that came into play in the intermeeting period was the involvement of the
banks as providers of credit and liquidity backstops in the [asset-backed commercial paper
(ABCP)] market” which caused “uncertainties about real estate markets, the performance of
nonprime mortgages, and structured-credit products [to come] to rest as greater uncertainty
about bank exposures.”145 It thus appeared to Fed policymakers that a lack of credible
information about the value of structured products and financial institutions’ exposures to
those products were significant factors inhibiting market functioning.
Moreover, Fed policymakers recognized even at this stage that for markets to recover,
market participants required information. As Krozsner explained:
People don’t have as much information as they thought they had. They were
relying on traditional rating agencies and on other sources that were perfectly
fine for traditional credits but more of a challenge for the newer credits [like
structured financial products]. . . . They are now going to have to invest much
more in getting that information.146
Mishkin similarly observed: “Of course, the big problem is really the issue of information
revelation and price discovery.”147 Interestingly, there was even some acknowledgment that it
may be appropriate for the Fed to play a role in this process. President Jeffrey Lacker, for
example, suggested that, “if we really think information constraints are at the heart of the
problem, it might be better to address this problem by addressing those constraints directly.”148
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He specifically proposed having the Fed “us[e its] supervisory authority to encourage and
facilitate greater transparency.”149 It was not an option the Fed pursued at the time.
iii. Bank Health. --- At this stage, there appears to have been relatively few concerns
about the financial health of banks in general, primarily because most financial institutions
appeared to have strong capital ratios, but there were some exceptions. Governor Kevin
Warsh, for example, noted that “when we look at these financial institutions, we are probably
more prudent to judge them by their actions rather than what these capital ratios would
suggest. Their actions are still not ebullient. Their actions are still not overly opportunistic.”150
Others expressed similar sentiments, suggesting that while banks appeared very well
capitalized and capable of withstanding the adverse developments, there were reasons for
concern.151
It was also clear that many large financial institutions were facing a number of
challenges that could adversely affect their financial health. Market conditions prevented banks
from being able to retain securitized loans they had originated with that intent and limited their
capacity to replace short-term “bridge” loans with longer term syndicated loans. Both of these
developments and the increasing utilization of outstanding credit lines had the effect of tying
up more capital than banks had anticipated.152 The most significant and troubling development
with respect to bank health, however, was the discovery that many banks had very significant
contingent, and sometimes implicit, liabilities that had not been reflected on their balance
sheets, raising questions about the accuracy and completeness of those balance sheets.
B.

January 2008: The First Intermeeting Rate Cut

By January, it had become clear that the challenging market conditions were likely to
persist for some time and conditions could get substantially worse. As Bernanke explained:
“The thrust that I got [from conversations with bankers] was that things are going to be pretty
tight. . . . As one banker put it in our meeting, ‘There is no Plan B.’”153 In other words, the
possibility acknowledged in August that there could be a further downward spiral in the
financial markets and that such a spiral could have significant and deleterious effects on the real
economy appeared even more likely in January. Reflecting the magnitude of concern about this
risk, the FOMC lowered the fed funds rate by 75 basis points to 3.5% on January 22, in a rare
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intermeeting action; and it lowered the rate an additional 50 basis points, to 3%, at its regularly
scheduled meeting on January 30. This section considers the rationales underlying those cuts
and the implications for this Essay’s claims. The section closes by exploring the challenges of
using monetary policy to respond to adverse developments in the financial markets and why it
may be valuable for the Fed to have more fine-tuned instruments to address such
developments.
i.
Extracting Information. --- In proposing the initial rate cut, Bernanke explained
that he was troubled by the conditions of the financial markets. As he noted, Carmen Reinhart
and Kenneth Rogoff had recently circulated a paper “which compares some indicators of our
economy with other major financial crises and finds that we rank at the moment among the five
largest financial crises in any industrial country since World War II.”154 In addition to
recognizing that the country already appeared to be in the midst of a significant financial crisis,
many Fed policymakers remained concerned that conditions could get substantially worse.
Mishkin, for example, emphasized that:
[T]here really is potential for a negative feedback loop that has not yet set in. The
financial disruption that we’re seeing right now could then mean a more
substantial worsening of the aggregate economy, and that could make the
financial markets have even more strain . . . . So I really worry about the
downside risks and think that they are very substantial . . . .155
Others expressed related concerns about the course the Crisis was taking.156 Fed policymakers
were thus confronting the challenge of how best to contain what appeared to be a significant
and growing financial crisis.
The magnitude of the perceived threat is reflected both in the Committee’s willingness
to approve a rare and controversial intermeeting rate cut and in the aggregate size of the two
cuts authorized. President Thomas Hoenig, for example, repeatedly noted that he was
“troubled” by the cut, but willing to support it because “[i]t is a very daunting thought to think
about a crisis that you might have avoided had you just taken certain actions.”157
There was also increasing appreciation that the Fed lacked the information and
understanding it needed to face the challenges ahead. As Kroszner observed, “it is hard for me

Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Conference Call on Jan. 21, 2008, at 8 (statement of Ben
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155 Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Meeting on Jan. 29--30, 2008, at 94 (statement of Frederic
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to really understand exactly what drove the . . . deterioration” at the end of 2007.158 In his view,
until the Fed understood the reasons that conditions were continuing to deteriorate, it had little
hope of successfully combatting those dynamics.159
The specific challenges plaguing the financial markets in January also shed light on
some of the factors contributing to the system’s fragility that the Fed should potentially know
more about than it did.160 One of the most pressing challenges was the deteriorating financial
health of the monoline insurers---insurance companies that traditionally specialized in insuring
municipal bonds but also had insured many AAA-rated MBS and other ABS. As Dudley
explained, the leading monoline insurers had recently had their credit ratings downgraded and
further downgrades were expected.161 This posed a number of challenges, primarily because
many of the MBS, other ABS, and related assets held by banks were insured, and when the
companies providing that insurance were downgraded, the banks had to mark down the value
of those assets accordingly.162
These developments thus brought to the fore many of the dynamics that contributed to
AIG’s near failure. It alerted the Fed to the magnitude of the interconnections between banks
and insurance companies and to the role of insurance policies (and economically similar
arrangements) covering MBS and related products in creating those exposures. It also
highlighted the potential for a rating downgrade of an insurance company to wreak havoc on
banks for reasons apart from the actual financial health of the insurance company. Perhaps most
importantly, these developments alerted the Fed to how little monitoring there often was of the
risk exposures of insurance companies generally. As Geithner explained: “We have had
extensive conversations with the New York State Insurance Commissioner, who is the lead
supervisor of many of them” and “[i]t turns out that office . . . has very little information,
particularly on the stuff that is on the leading edge of concern, which is to whom they sold
credit protection and on what.”163 Dudley also noted that “there’s quite a bit of cloudiness about
what their true condition is.”164
The Fed also had a much more robust picture of what went wrong in August 2007. The
FOMC’s regularly scheduled January meeting included a “special presentation on policy issues
raised by [the] financial crisis,”165 including a “diagnosis” which suggested that the two most
important contributing factors were: “(1) a loss of investor confidence in the ratings of
structured-finance products and [ABCP], which caused structured-credit markets to seize up
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and ABCP markets to contract, and (2) the resulting losses and balance sheet pressures on
financial intermediaries, especially many of the largest global financial services
organizations.”166 Other evidence suggested these challenges persisted and were continuing to
contribute to the ongoing market dysfunction.
The staff presentation on the Crisis also provided information from a study conducted in
conjunction with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the primary supervisor
of all national banks, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which ran the
Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) Program, through which it had supervisory authority
over the five leading investment banks. The study examined the quality of risk management at
large financial institutions and it revealed a very mixed bag. Some firms appeared to have
robust and effective risk management systems; others did not. The study found that the “less
effective” firms “operated with more limited liquidity and capital buffers,” “did not have limit
structures that were consistently or effectively enforced,” “did not properly aggregate or
monitor off-balance sheet exposures across the organization,” “were siloed . . . and were
comparatively slower in taking actions to mitigate exposures,” had thought less “about the
interplay of their risk measures,” had less “timely and scalable management information
systems,” were less “disciplined in how they valued the holdings of complex or potentially
illiquid securities,” “relied heavily on third-party views of risk,” and “tended to have a
narrower view of the risks associated with their CDO business.”167
In other words, there were massive deficiencies in the risk-management systems of some major
financial institutions, limiting their capacity to understand, much less manage, their risk
exposures.
ii. Disseminating Information. --- In addition to recognizing that conditions seemed
to be getting worse rather than better, Fed policymakers recognized that informational
dynamics continued to be a significant factor contributing to that decline. As Geithner noted,
“There [remains] a huge amount of uncertainty about the size and the location of remaining
credit losses across the system.”168 Kohn similarly observed: “The extraordinary volatility in
markets is, I think, indicative of underlying uncertainty, and that underlying uncertainty itself
will discourage risk-taking.”169 He further highlighted that “[t]he monoline issue raises
questions about who will bear the losses [stemming from the declining housing prices] and
provides another channel for problems spreading through the credit markets.”170 And, as just
discussed, the Fed staff also presented new analyses regarding the dynamics that had
contributed to the liquidity crunch that occurred in August, which emphasized the role that
uncertainty played in contributing to it. By January 2008, it was thus plain that a lack of
information about the value of MBS and other securitized assets and the impact of potential
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losses on those assets on the health of major financial institutions persisted and those dynamics
were contributing to, and could significantly aggravate, market dysfunction.
iii. Bank Health. --- By January, some Fed policymakers had become quite concerned
about the financial health of banks generally. A presentation by Fed staff showed that the
largest banks remained “well-capitalized,” as that term was defined under the then-prevailing
statutory scheme, but there had “been significant erosion of their capital ratios over the past two
quarters.”171 It was thus evident that the developments in the financial markets and the
declining value of certain assets were having significant and adverse effects on bank balance
sheets.
Continuing a theme from August, some questioned how much comfort regulators
should take from banks’ supposedly adequate capitalization ratios. Warsh, for example,
believed that “financial institutions as a group are . . . undercapitalized, even with the recent
capital infusions.”172 He further observed: “Income statement shortfalls due to falling profits,
poor visibility, weaker pipelines, and the need to reduce headcounts meaningfully strike me in
some ways as a more urgent and troublesome issue for large financial institutions than their
balance sheet weaknesses” and while “the window for foreign investment is open now, I
wouldn’t expect that window to stay open throughout 2008.”173 Warsh was thus not only
questioning bank health, he was also raising questions regarding the adequacy of the
information the Fed possessed and was relying on to assess bank health and he was suggesting
that a more forward-looking approach might be more informative.
Warsh also identified one of the core challenges underlying the problems that had
already surfaced and which would give rise to those that lay ahead. As he explained, large
financial “institutions have been built, or should I say rebuilt, over the past six years to prepare
themselves for a low volatility, high liquidity world, and what they found is the exact
opposite.”174 He thus recognized that both their balance sheets and business models were
designed to maximize profits in a world that no longer existed and would not return. Moreover
“[t]hey are at different levels of understanding the new world”---some get it, some do not--“and it will take . . . time to rebuild their businesses to be profitable in it.”175 In short, at least
some policymakers believed that financial institutions were in real trouble, those troubles were
likely to get worse before they got better, some institutions were in denial regarding the
challenges they faced, and while institutions could raise the new capital they would need to
survive the transition in the current environment, they likely needed to do so quickly.
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Others raised similar concerns and made other suggestions regarding the type of
information that the Fed might want from banks. President Eric Rosengren, for example, raised
concerns about the adequacy of banks’ risk management systems. He observed:
[A] horizontal stress review was done about a year ago . . . . When they did that
stress testing, what was striking was that there were four institutions---I think it
was Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Wachovia, and Bank of America . . . and all four
concluded that a housing-price reduction of between 10 percent and 20 percent
would affect earnings but wouldn’t affect capital. Obviously, in retrospect that
doesn’t seem to have been a good forecast.176
He also recommended going back and repeating the exercise, both because it would be helpful
for the institutions and because “[federal policymakers would] learn something about how
they’re thinking about housing prices and the indirect effects that might occur because one of
our concerns . . . is that there may be unintended consequences if housing prices drop more
than they have historically.”177 This not only functions as a reminder that horizontal stress tests
were a tool that the Fed and other bank supervisors had been using for some time, but it also
reveals that as early as January 2008, there was support for using horizontal stress tests to
provide higher quality information to both the Fed and banks about the risks to which banks
were exposed and to test banks’ capacity to accurately assess how they would fare in the face of
further adverse developments.
iv. Tool Set. ---- The January meetings also highlight the challenge of using
monetary policy to combat the perceived threats to the financial system. The core challenge, as
articulated by staff economist Brian Madigan, is that while “aggressive policy easing would
help mitigate economic weakness, it would also raise the risk that policy could add unduly to
inflation pressures should recessionary weakness not develop.”178 Put differently, by positively
affecting asset prices, economic growth, and other factors that affect the health of financial
institutions and the stability of the financial system, monetary policy can play an important role
in reducing or mitigating a nascent financial crisis. But it is a coarse and sometimes excessively
high-powered tool and there are always risks associated with its use. Moreover, the primary
risk associated with easy money policies, inflation, was one that the FOMC felt it could not
ignore. In January, following a trend that would continue, Madigan noted that “the inflation
picture seems to have deteriorated somewhat,” i.e., there was reason for concern.179 Many
Committee members were also concerned that lowering the fed funds rate between scheduled
meetings could damage the Fed’s credibility, create expectations of further rate cuts, and send a
signal that the Fed was panicking.
Some members also questioned whether rate cuts would actually reduce the risks that
the Fed was seeking to contain. As Lacker noted: “I can appreciate the possibility of financial
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market fragility, but I don’t see the level of the funds rate as real closely tied to conditions of
fragility.”180 He explained: “I don’t think a funds rate change is going to save the monolines. I
don’t think it is going to save financial institutions from the monolines.”181 And, in his view,
those were the core challenges. The drawbacks with using monetary policy to address the
challenges the Fed was facing help demonstrate the value to the Fed of having more refined
tools for addressing a growing financial crisis.
C.

March 2008: New Liquidity Facilities and the Failure of Bear Stearns

A critical turning point in the Crisis was the failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008. With
the help of a $29 billion backstop from the NY Fed, Bear was acquired by J.P. Morgan rather
than filing for bankruptcy. The purchase price made all creditors whole182 and ultimately
provided equity holders $10 per share.183 To ensure that the Fed would not lose money on the
backstop, and solidifying the close working relationship between the Fed and Treasury in
response to the Crisis, the Treasury committed to making the NY Fed whole if the collateral
Bear posted proved insufficient to cover the amount owed.184 This event was important because
of the information that Bear’s failure conveyed to policymakers and market participants and,
separately, because the Fed’s decision to help Bear avoid filing for bankruptcy implicitly
affirmed too-big-to-fail (or, more accurately, too interconnected to fail) as a government policy.
The increased expectation of government intervention altered market activity and, presumably,
should have made it clear to Fed and other policymakers that the Fed may well provide support
to a financial institution---even one that it does not supervise and about which it thus might
have little information---if the welfare ramifications of allowing it to fail seem sufficiently great.
It was also in March that the Fed introduced the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF)
and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), liquidity facilities available to the primary
dealers rather than banks.185 In connection with these facilities, the Fed ultimately put small

January 21, 2008 FOMC Conference Call, supra note 154, at 16 (statement of Jeffrey Lacker).
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183 Landon Thomas Jr. & Eric Dash, Seeking Fast Deal, JPMorgan Quintuples Bear Stearns Bid, N.Y. Times
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teams on-site at Lehman and the other investment banks and eventually entered into an
information-sharing arrangement with their primary regulator, the SEC.186 This section explores
the implication of these developments, concluding with a closer look at how the support
provided by the NY Fed altered dynamics in ways relevant to this Essay’s claims.
i.
Extracting Information. --- The near-failure of Bear revealed that the Fed lacked
access to timely information about the health of at least some systemically important financial
institutions. It further revealed massive deficiencies in the oversight regime then in place and
cast doubt on the SEC’s capacity to understand and respond to risk-taking at the major
investment banks. At a meeting just prior to Bear’s failure, the Fed approved the TSLF, a facility
that would provide loans to primary dealers, including Bear Stearns. Nonetheless, there was but
one reference to Bear Stearns at the meeting and no discussion of its financial health. A
subsequent congressional hearing revealed that no federal regulator appreciated the firm’s
“precarious health,” and they learned of its intent to file for bankruptcy only the day before the
firm expected to file.187 The event thus revealed massive gaps in the capacity of the regime then
in place to provide financial policymakers timely and accurate information about the financial
health of the major investment banks.
Also notable, as explained by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox shortly after Bear’s
failure, was that the “experience demonstrated . . . that the prevailing measurements of capital
and liquidity that were then being used by the SEC and by every bank regulator . . . were
inadequate to prevent the ‘run on the bank’ that Bear endured. In just two days . . . , Bear’s
liquidity pool fell by over 83%,” and “[s]hort-term secured financing was unavailable even
when Bear offered high-quality collateral.”188 This was a development that no “regulatory
approach” or “existing regulatory model had taken into account.”189 It was thus clear that the
information that the Fed and others were relying on as prognosticators of financial institution
health failed to accurately portend probable demise.
The decision to save Bear also revealed specific information gaps and other limitations
inherent in the then-existing regulatory regime. For example, in assessing the ramifications of
allowing Bear to fail and choosing to intervene to prevent that outcome, Fed officials were again
alerted to the critical role of interconnections among firms as a mechanism through which the
system could be threatened. According to the minutes of the Board meeting approving the loan,
the Board reasoned “that, given the fragile condition of the financial markets at the time, the
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prominent position of Bear Stearns in those markets, and the expected contagion that would
result from the immediate failure of Bear Stearns, the best alternative available was to provide
temporary emergency financing.”190 Bernanke similarly emphasized, when defending the action
before Congress a few weeks later, the Fed was concerned that Bear’s “failure could . . . have
cast doubt on the financial positions of some of Bear Stearns’ thousands of counterparties.”191
This suggests that the Fed was worried about the actual losses that Bear’s failure would impose
on other financial institutions and it was concerned that even if Bear’s counterparties could
handle the resulting losses, the counterparties of Bear’s counterparties may not know that and
this latter dynamic could itself impede market functioning.192
The second rationale that Bernanke emphasized in defending the Fed’s action was that
“Bear Stearns participated extensively in a range of critical markets” and the Fed was concerned
that “the sudden failure of Bear Stearns likely would have led to a chaotic unwinding of
positions in those markets and could have severely shaken confidence.”193 In contemplating the
effects of allowing Bear to file for bankruptcy, the Fed thus had become attuned to the limited
capacity of the resolution regimes then in place to facilitate an orderly liquidation of such a firm
and the potential for such a process to trigger profound and adverse ripple effects throughout
the financial system.
In addition to revealing weaknesses, the procedures the Fed undertook in deciding to
provide support to Bear also reveal significant strengths in terms of the Fed’s capacity to
respond creatively and aggressively when it chooses to do so. The information-gathering
activities the Fed engaged in illustrate this dynamic. For example, to assess the ramifications of
Bear’s failure, the Fed “surveyed those institutions subject to the Board’s regulation to assess
their exposure to Bear Stearns,” with particular attention to “the exposure of large complex
banking organizations.”194 Thus it used the supervisory relationships to gather information that
was not directly relevant to the supervision, but which allowed it to make a more informed
decision with respect to another issue the Fed was facing. This act also highlights that even
financial institutions that the Fed oversaw directly---including many banks that were using TAF
as an important source of liquidity---had information that the Fed did not otherwise regularly
seek in connection with its supervisory activities and which could have been incredibly useful
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to the Fed in its efforts to manage the evolving financial crisis.
To assess and manage the credit risk inherent in providing the backstop supporting the
acquisition, the Fed recognized that it also needed information about the quality of the assets
that Bear wanted to post as collateral. In order to obtain this information in the limited time
available, Geithner “called Larry Fink, the CEO of the investment firm BlackRock,” to evaluate
the assets.195 The episode thus also demonstrates that the Fed can, and during the Crisis
regularly did, use outside consultants when it needs expertise or simply greater manpower than
it can muster internally. This enables the Fed to expand its information-gathering and analyzing
capacities quite quickly when it chooses to.196
Other issues discussed during the March FOMC meetings further support the notion
that policymakers who subscribed to the proposed paradigm for how a LOLR can best use that
authority might have recognized the importance of prioritizing information gathering and
analysis. Even prior to Bear’s failure, Kroszner, for example, worried that the TSLF “may be just
another step along a path that we haven’t really defined well.”197 This concern entailed a
number of distinct issues, including concerns about a slippery slope and exit strategy, but he
was particularly concerned that the program may not be enough and may not address the heart
of the challenge. As he explained:
I don’t really understand why some of the risk spreads have blown out again in
the last week or two. That doesn’t mean that we need to study it to death . . . .
But I think we need to have a bigger-picture view to see what is going to go next
and how to respond going forward to people who say, “Well, you’ve tried five
different little things, and none has really worked, or they work as temporary
palliatives.” So I think we really need to understand the origins of this better to
better understand how we can respond.198
This statement reflects an awareness of the Fed’s limited understanding of the challenges it was
facing and a recognition that without such an understanding, it was far less likely that the Fed
would be able to meaningfully address those challenges. Nonetheless, when the Fed met later
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that month---after Bear had failed and the Fed had stepped in to rescue it---there was little
indication that the Fed was particularly concerned about becoming better informed about the
reasons for the ongoing problems in the financial markets and how they could best respond.
The overall tone and focus of the March meetings also suggest that better information
may have altered the Fed’s focus, discussions, and actions in productive ways. Throughout
March, the appropriate fed funds rate remained the primary topic of the discussions. While this
focus, in itself, may be explained by virtue of the FOMC’s function, the tenor of those
discussions cannot be so easily dismissed. Two FOMC members, for example, voted against the
rate cut effectuated at the March meeting.199 One of the dissenters noted he had some concerns
about growth, but he felt that the situation was notably less dire than some others perceived it
to be.200 At the same time, he was very concerned about inflation, and he believed that cutting
rates further would prioritize growth over price stability, setting the stage for future inflation.201
Even Committee members who approved the cut spent significant time addressing the
inflationary risks, a focus that necessarily diverted attention from the pending crisis and the
many issues raised by Bear’s failure and salvation.202
ii. Disseminating Information. --- Bear’s near failure also held lessons regarding
market participants’ lack of credible information about the health of other financial institutions
and how that lack of information could adversely affect market functioning. As an initial
matter, Bear’s demise cast doubt on the reliability of the type of information market participants
typically utilized to assess the health of a financial institution. As Dudley explained, “[t]he
disparity between [Bear’s] book value [which had been $84 per share at the end of the last fiscal
year] and the purchase price caused investors to question the accuracy of investment banks’
financial statements more generally.”203 A related challenge was that Bear’s demise appeared to
be the product of a “run,” as investors and counterparties lost confidence in the firm and sought
to protect their individual interests despite the costs it might impose on the collective.204 The
event thus revealed that even a bank that did not rely on depositors could fail quickly and
appearing to be well capitalized did not ensure a firm would survive.205 Additionally, as just
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described, the Fed’s decision to support Bear was justified in part by concerns that uncertainty
among financial counterparties about the effect that Bear’s failure would have on each other
could have crippled market functioning.206
The discussion at the FOMC meeting following Bear’s failure suggests that Committee
members recognized that insufficient information was contributing to systemic fragility.
Charles Evans, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, explained, “I believe our
innovative policies are helpful for facilitating market functioning, but they don’t address the
root problem. Markets want a firmer sense of where prices for stressed assets will bottom out
and of the magnitude of the portfolio losses that will be taken by major financial players.”207
Charles Plosser, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, similarly noted that
“[u]ncertainty about valuations seems to be the root cause of liquidity problems.”208 Members of
the FOMC thus recognized that liquidity was a symptom, not just a cause, of the ongoing
market dysfunction and that lack of information was a significant factor contributing to the
ongoing challenges.
iii. Bank Health. --- The FOMC transcripts also reveal that Fed policymakers were
increasingly concerned about the health of large financial institutions. Governor Kohn, for
example, explained: “I agree with the others who say that [our innovations, while helpful] don’t
directly deal with the underlying macro risk, which is really a story about capital, solvency,
wealth, and prices.”209 Governor Warsh reiterated this concern, “highlight[ing] . . . the need,
across all these institutions, to raise significant capital for safety and soundness purposes and,
in addition, for credit availability purposes” as “this broad class is systematically
undercapitalized.”210 Warsh also went further, suggesting that in light of his assessment of the
industry, he believed that the Fed should “use all our tools to persuade them that it is in their
interest and in the interest of the broad economy for them to raise capital.”211
To be sure, others, including Geithner, disagreed with the assessment that the financial
system as a whole was undercapitalized.212 That there were such mixed views on such a

Sunday March 16, Bear Stearns had a capital ratio of well in excess of the 10% level used by the Federal
Reserve Board in its ‘well-capitalized’ standard”). Cox also suggested that the firm failed, in part, because
counterparties refused to work with it “[n]otwithstanding that Bear Stearns continued to have high
quality collateral to provide as security for borrowings.” Id.
206 See March 18, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 200 , at 61 (statement of Kevin M. Warsh) (noting
“counterparty risk has become the dominant concern in markets”).
207 Id. at 40 (statement of Charles Evans).
208 Id. at 52 (statement of Charles Plosser); see also id. at 61 (statement of Kevin M. Warsh) (“Over the past
couple of weeks, not just in the episode with Bear Stearns, counterparty risk has become the dominant
concern in markets.”).
209 Id. at 58 (statement of Donald Kohn).
210 Id. at 62 (statement of Kevin M. Warsh).
211 Id.
212 Cf. at 74--75 (arguing against ability to make accurate judgment as to undercapitalization).

46

fundamental issue, however, largely affirms why this may have been an important issue for the
Fed to investigate further.
iv. Fed Interventions and Market Expectations. --- The events of March 2008 also
highlight the way that regulatory responses to a persistent liquidity crisis affect the capacity of
the system to withstand further adverse developments. That government policies and actions
change market expectations is well recognized and there is a growing appreciation of the ways
that steps the government takes seeking to mitigate a crisis can have the counterproductive
effect of making the system more fragile and the ultimate fallout even more damaging.213 A few
dynamics merit particular attention.
First, in choosing to save Bear, the Fed sent a strong signal that it would not allow a firm
to fail when its failure might have adverse systemic repercussions and connections with other
financial firms or a presence in critical markets might suffice as a basis for intervention. The
market responded accordingly.214 This was foreseeable and specifically acknowledged by Fed
policymakers. As Lacker noted in May, one drawback of having the Fed seek greater
supervisory authority over investment banks and other primary dealers is:
[It] is just going to sustain the expectations that have arisen since Bear---which
have been described and referenced a couple of times and which you see in the
fall in CDS spreads for those institutions---and it is just really hard to see how to
put that genie back in the bottle and limit the extent to which we’re viewed as
backstopping them.215
More generally, as Bernanke observed at the FOMC’s June meeting in response to apparent
improvements in some indicators of systemic distress, “I do not agree that systemic risk has
gone away. I think it is in abeyance. There is perhaps, if anything, excessive confidence in the
ability of the Fed to prevent a crisis situation from metastasizing.”216 By increasing participants’
estimations that the Fed would prevent a major financial institution from failing, the action
weakened market discipline and increased the likelihood that market participants would be illprepared should a systemically significant firm actually file for bankruptcy.217
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A related challenge is that the signal was sent not only to counterparties of major
financial institutions, but also to the executives making decisions on behalf of those institutions.
Richard Fuld, Lehman’s CEO, has said that he never thought that the government would allow
Lehman to fail.218 Similarly, SEC Chairman Cox has suggested that “people would have
behaved differently if they were not expecting the government to do something,” and their
capacity to do so would have been aided significantly if that “message could have been
provided . . . more than a week before” Lehman’s demise.219 It thus appears that the Fed’s
rescue of Bear not only sent a signal to the market that it would likely find a way to prevent
Lehman from failing, it also altered the way that executives at Lehman assessed their options
and reduced their sense of urgency.220
Through the two liquidity facilities for primary dealers, the Fed further contributed to
Lehman’s fragility and its capacity to delay making difficult decisions. As Geithner
acknowledged in June, “By definition, our facilities by design should allow them [the
investment banks] to run with a mix of leverage and liquidity risk that is above what the market
probably now would permit. In the absence of our facilities, leverage and liquidity risk, if you
measured it on a scale, would have to be lower . . . .”221 This flexibility was particularly
important to Lehman’s ongoing survival during this period. As Dudley explained, also in June:
“There were a number of people to whom we talked who said that the reason they stayed with
Lehman during this period of stress was that they knew that the [Primary Dealer Credit
Facility] was there as a backstop. So I have a high degree of confidence that Lehman would
have been in great difficulty without it.”222
These developments were not viewed, at the time, as solely problematic. Allowing
financial institutions to delever more slowly than they otherwise would was one aim of the
temporary facilities and may have been helpful in averting fire sales. Nonetheless, it is clear that
Fed officials knew that their programs enabled Lehman to remain more highly levered and less
liquid than the market would otherwise allow, rendering Lehman more vulnerable to adverse
shocks.223 These indirect means of support are critical, as Lehman may have had better options
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if the market had forced it to make difficult decisions earlier than September.224 Even according
to Lehman’s own overly rosy assessments, the firm lost nearly $7 billion in just the second and
third quarters of 2008, far more than it raised during the period.225
A final issue is that Bear’s failure could have triggered legal reforms, which would have
significantly affected subsequent developments. Shortly after Bear’s failure, the Chairman of the
SEC, the one agency with oversight responsibility for the investment banks, recognized the
insufficiency of the current regime and the need for greater regulation.226 Some in Congress
seemed to agree and also appeared open to suggestions for how the regulatory structure should
be changed to address gaps revealed by Bear’s near failure.227 Nonetheless, no Fed or Treasury
officials pushed for immediate reform, and no changes were enacted along these lines.
D.

Summer 2008

Nearly six months passed between March 2008, when the Fed bailed out Bear Stearns
and adopted facilities available to primary dealers, and the developments of September 2008,
which triggered the nadir of the Crisis and expanded the scope of the government safety net
through the extension of its implicit too-big-to-fail policy.228 There are numerous signs
suggesting that during this period, financial policymakers were exceptionally concerned about
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the health of the financial system and the potential for the situation to deteriorate further. As
Geithner describes in his autobiography: “I felt like I was watching a disaster unfold in slow
motion, with no ability to prevent it and weak tools to limit the damages.”229 Some regulators
also started to engage in contingency planning should conditions deteriorate further. It was
during this period, for example, that Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson and his staff
devised the blueprint for the subsequently adopted Term Asset Relief Program (TARP), which
initially entailed a proposal for the government to spend up to $500 billion to acquire MBS and
other illiquid assets.230
In many ways, what is most notable about this period, however, is not what happened
but what did not, particularly considering the lessons reflected in and arising from the near
failure of Bear. Rather than canvassing all that happened and could have happened over the
course of these six months or engaging in a detailed analysis of FOMC meeting transcripts,
which reflect many of the same concerns identified during the first seven months of the Crisis,
this section focuses on issues that proved particularly pivotal---the financial health of Lehman
and AIG and the systemic ramifications of allowing either to fail.
i.
Lehman. --- According to Geithner, one of the most pressing challenges facing
the Fed during this period was that the Fed “had only limited tools to defend against a run on
firms outside the commercial banking system, at a time when running seemed increasingly
rational.”231 The failure of Bear Stearns had vividly demonstrated just how quickly an
investment bank, even one that was seemingly well capitalized, could fail if counterparties
refused to work with it, and it illustrated that counterparties might run more quickly than
previously appreciated. Both regulators and market participants viewed Lehman as the next
most vulnerable of the investment banks.232 This section considers, in turn, the Fed’s monitoring
of Lehman and the planning it undertook in anticipation of its possible failure.
a.
Increased but Still Limited Monitoring. --- Starting in March 2008, the Fed
invoked a right to know more about the financial health of the investment banks and other
primary dealers as a condition for standing ready to lend. Notably, while some Fed
policymakers questioned whether the Fed should demand information from investment banks
in connection with the adoption of the TSLF, the first facility to provide credit to primary
dealers, Geithner downplayed the Fed’s capacity to use its status as creditor to demand
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information or impose other conditions on eligible institutions.233 Nonetheless, by the time he
wrote his autobiography, he recalled that starting in March, he took the position that, “[i]f [the
investment banks] were going to enjoy access to Fed liquidity, we needed to understand and
limit the risks they were taking” which meant “climb[ing] inside the investment banks” and not
“rely[ing] on the SEC anymore.”234 And the Fed did demand greater information in connection
with its adoption of its second facility for primary dealers, the PDCF.
For the next six months, the Fed engaged in a monitoring program that focused
“primarily, but not exclusively, on [the] four [largest] investment banks.”235 As explained by the
Fed staff in a June presentation to the FOMC: “Our effort does not stem from our general
supervisory examination authority.”236 Rather, they sought “to exercise informed judgment
about the capital and liquidity positions of the primary dealers that have access to the PDCF”
and “to, in shorthand, mitigate the moral hazard that accompanies the creation of the PDCF in
particular.”237 There is no indication that any of the primary dealers, including the investment
banks, in any way challenged or protested the authority of the Fed to engage in additional
monitoring; nor is there any sign that any stigma resulted from the heightened scrutiny.
The scope of these operations was “fairly narrow,”238 focusing almost exclusively on
capital and liquidity. The staffing seems to have been correspondingly modest, with “several”239
NY Fed staff on-site at Lehman and with the overall operations supported by only a “small offsite staff.”240 The limited scope of the Fed’s investigatory efforts is reflected in the amount of
information the Fed did not possess about Lehman until after its bankruptcy. Perhaps the most
famous of Lehman’s efforts to disguise its actual financial health was its Repo 105 program,
which enabled the firm to appear less leveraged than it actually was in its public financial
statements.241 Because the transactions were specifically taken with the aim of distorting the
accuracy of the company’s public filings and misleading counterparties and investors who
relied on those filings, they are precisely the type of transactions that it is most important for
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regulators with inside access to detect.242 Yet the Fed’s monitoring was sufficiently limited that
it had no knowledge of these transactions until much later.243
The FOMC discussed the limited scope of the Fed’s monitoring activities at its June 2008
meeting. Arthur Angulo, who led the presentation, explained that the NY Fed was monitoring
investment banks’ capital, but “we know from examining banks that a capital number that’s
reported to you depends on how you’re carrying your assets” and, “we’re basically taking the
inputs . . . at face value and not doing our own work to try to validate those.”244 This was true
even though there had been numerous questions raised about the values Lehman was placing
on its assets and despite the lessons learned (and capabilities demonstrated) in connection with
the Bear episode.245 Angulo further acknowledged, “we have not really looked to a consolidated
assessment of risk management at these firms, something we do in the bank supervision
process.”246
Significantly, Angulo suggested that the Fed should consider more rigorous oversight.
As he explained to the Committee, “six months or a year from now, I think it’s going to be very
difficult to say that we’re just doing this liquidity and capital thing. People are going to want to
know a little more about our judgments and how we made those judgments”247 and “there’s
some risk to making those judgments without having a little more information. So I think . . . if
we have our traditional bank supervision model on the left and what we’re doing right now on
the right, we have to move this way, more to the left.”248 There is no indication that such a move
was subsequently undertaken.
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This failure is all the more surprising in light of what the Fed did learn about Lehman
from its limited information-gathering activities.249 Exercising its authority as a potential
creditor, the Fed forced Lehman and the other investment banks to assess how they would
perform if subject to a run comparable to that Bear Stearns had faced. Those assessments,
conducted in May 2008, revealed that none of the investment banks would survive such a
run.250 In the face of those findings, the Fed does not appear to have taken any steps, either
directly or in conjunction with the SEC, to ensure the firms increased their liquidity provisions
or otherwise enhanced their resilience. Instead, the Fed weakened the test.251 Even this “Bearlite” scenario did not look good for Lehman. The NY Fed found that “Lehman would need $84
billion in additional liquidity to survive a severe run” akin to that faced by Bear and would
require “$15 billion to survive a somewhat less severe run.”252 In short, absent significant
government support, it was clear that Lehman would fail in the face of a run. More generally, as
Bernanke testified, “[T]he information [the Fed] obtained suggested that the capital and
liquidity of the firm were seriously deficient.”253
There were also numerous indications that Lehman failed to comprehend the nature and
magnitude of the challenges it was facing and was excessively hesitant to raise new capital.254
For example, when Lehman ran its own test to assess how the firm would fare under the Bearline scenario, “Lehman’s risk managers . . . concluded they would weather the storm with $13
billion in cash to spare.”255
b.
Understanding of the Risks. --- The other issue critical to the analysis here is
whether Fed policymakers had the information necessary to assess the ramifications of a
Lehman bankruptcy. Here, the transcripts of a conference call among members of the FOMC on
September 16, the day after Lehman failed, are telling. By the time of the call, numerous
indicators---including the stock market, interbank lending rates, and Treasury yields---indicated
significant market strain, so one would expect that even Committee members who
underestimated the negative ramifications of Lehman’s failure would have already revised their
expectations downward.256 Nonetheless, many remained relatively undisturbed by the
bankruptcy.
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The views of James Bullard, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, while
rosier than some, are not atypical. In arguing against the need to cut the fed funds rate, he
acknowledged that “[f]inancial market turmoil is certainly a key concern,” but he then
emphasized that “the U.S. economy still outperformed expectations in the first half of 2008,
despite the demise of Bear Stearns---an event” that, in his view, was “not too different in some
respects from the current episode.”257 He proceeded to note: “My sense is that three large
uncertainties looming over the economy have now been resolved---the GSEs and the fates of
Lehman and Merrill Lynch . . . . Normally, the elimination of key uncertainties is a plus for the
economy.”258 And, he said that a “positive” dimension to denying funding support to Lehman
or potential acquirers was that “the Fed has begun to reestablish the idea that markets should
not expect help at each difficult juncture.”259 Based on this analysis, he was of the view that the
Fed should “wait for some time to assess the impact of the Lehman bankruptcy filing, if any, on
the national economy” rather than “react[ing] too hastily to a fluid situation.”260 With the
benefit of hindsight, Bernanke has acknowledged that Fed policymakers had a “range of views”
about the likely impact of Lehman’s failure, and yet the actual ramifications were “worse than
almost anybody expected.”261 Both the variations in their assessments and the magnitude of the
disparity between any of those assessments and what came to pass suggest the Fed
policymakers lacked the information they needed to make the best decisions under the
circumstances.
It is also possible to identify specific deficiencies in the information matrix available to
Fed officials in deciding to allow Lehman to fail. For example, interconnections among different
markets and market actors played a critical role in contributing to market dysfunction
throughout the Crisis, and in saving Bear, the Fed seemed concerned about these dynamics.262
Having recognized the importance of interconnections to assessing the systemic ramifications of
allowing an institution to fail, the Fed could have sought information about other financial
institutions’ exposures to Lehman. Similarly, having recognized that an institution’s presence
in particular markets could also be a mechanism of systemically troubling contagion, the Fed
could have sought to identify critical markets which may be adversely affected should Lehman
fail. Yet, based upon the information reviewed, there is little indication the Fed made any effort
to gather such information. There are also signs that even after Lehman’s failure, the Fed
dramatically underestimated the nature and size of credit exposures among financial
institutions.263 It thus appears that additional information about Lehman’s exposures, how
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financial institutions might respond to its failure, and the ramifications of its failures on
particular markets may have altered Fed policymakers’ assessments of the ramifications of
allowing Lehman to fail.
ii. AIG. --- The day after Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the Fed, with support from
Treasury, committed to providing AIG $85 billion in liquidity support, without which it too
would have filed for bankruptcy.264 At the time the liquidity facility was created, Fed
policymakers knew little about AIG. Geithner, for example, has said that up until the weekend
before the Fed made that commitment, he had “very little knowledge about the company” and
he had more interactions with AIG than any other leading Fed policymaker.265 Because of this
limited knowledge, he “thought we were taking enormous, unprecedented risks and that there
was substantial risk that we would lose billions of dollars, if not tens of billions of dollars.”266 As
with Lehman, Geithner (and others) have explained their ignorance on the basis that “the Fed
had no authority or responsibility to supervise insurance companies.”267 This Section considers
whether there was information available to the Fed suggesting that it should have sought to
learn more about AIG earlier than it did and some of the ramifications of its failure to do so.
AIG’s liquidity crisis was triggered by collateral calls from financial institutions that
were counterparties to credit-default swaps (CDS) pursuant to which an AIG subsidiary had
effectively insured the performance of MBS and similar instruments and exposures.268 AIG’s
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senior management was aware that the company might face crippling liquidity demands and
that the firm had alerted the NY Fed to this possibility months before these events came to pass.
As Geithner recounts, “In July, Bob Willumstad[, the AIG CEO,] had visited the Fed and danced
around the issue of whether we might be able to help if AIG’s liquidity ever dried up.”269 After
one of these meetings, some members of the NY Fed staff had met with the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS)---AIG’s primary bank regulator----“to discuss AIG,” and, in Geithner’s own
telling, the staff at the meeting “had come away alarmed.”270 Fed policymakers also knew from
other recent experiences that the OTS had regularly failed to detect problems and control risk
taking at banks it oversaw and that the OTS had failed to communicate new and relevant
information to the Fed in a timely manner.271 The Fed thus had been alerted to the possibility
that AIG might face a situation where it would not have the liquidity it needed to continue
operations without government support and it had little reason to have faith that the insurance
or bank regulators with primary responsibility for AIG understood the risks to which the firm
was exposed.
The Fed was also on notice that if AIG ran out of liquidity, the systemic ramifications
might be sufficiently severe that the Fed would feel obliged to intervene to avert such an
outcome. As reflected in the concerns about the monoline insurers, Fed officials had been
alerted to the high degree of connectedness between insurance companies and other financial
institutions and that insurance policies and credit default swaps (that operated like insurance)
were an important mechanism of interconnection. Moreover, in connection with alerting the
Fed to its liquidity risk, AIG had also attempted to communicate to the Fed just how
interconnected it was. In July, Willumstad presented Geithner with information about AIG’s
sizeable connections with Wall Street firms.272 Additionally, Fed officials continued to recognize
that interconnections could be a basis for intervention. As Lacker noted at the FOMC’s June
meeting in discussing the support the Fed has provided to Bear: “I think it’s likely that any
other institution that presents the same threat of a disorderly resolution is going to be perceived
as benefiting from our implicit lending support, whether or not they’re a primary dealer, unless
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we say something otherwise, unless we draw a boundary, and unless we make that credible.”273
Lacker even identified “insurance companies” as among the types of firms that “could easily
fail in a disruptive way.”274
The Fed did not have oversight authority over AIG, but there were a number of
mechanisms through which the Fed could have learned more about the situations that might
cause the firm to face a liquidity crunch and the ramifications if it did. Given that the CEO had
come to the Fed on multiple occasions exploring the idea of government support, it is possible
that AIG might have provided such information had it been asked.275 Separately, the Fed could
have used its LOLR authority to gather significant additional information about AIG’s
exposures. AIG’s key counterparties were virtually all banks or other financial institutions with
access to the Fed’s liquidity facilities. Goldman Sachs, for example, was one of AIG’s most
significant counterparties and it was collateral calls by Goldman that played a critical role in
draining AIG of the liquidity it needed to operate without government support.276 The Fed had
an on-site team at Goldman and was already demanding that Goldman provide its nonpublic
information in connection with its eligibility to use the PDCF and TSLF. Foreign banks, many of
whom were the leading users of the TAF, also had significant counterparty exposures to AIG.277
Thus, had the Fed chosen to use its LOLR authority to generate information, it likely could have
collected a significant body of information about AIG’s exposures, the liquidity demands it
could face, and other matters pertinent to AIG’s financial health and the ramifications of
allowing it to fail.
The incredibly limited information the Fed had about AIG is critical to understanding
the nature and magnitude of the risks the Fed assumed when it committed to bail out AIG.
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that AIG was facing a liquidity crisis and was otherwise
a solvent institution. This has significantly enhanced the government’s capacity to extricate
itself from AIG and to make (rather than lose) money on its investment.278 But in assessing that
decision, it is important to recognize that this was far from clear at the time the NY Fed
committed to providing the liquidity required to save AIG. As Dudley acknowledged at an
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FOMC meeting on September 16, the day that the Fed made that commitment, “a lot of times
when people look closer at the books they find out that the liquidity crisis may also be a
solvency issue” and “it is still a little unclear whether AIG’s problems are confined just to
liquidity. It also may be an issue of how much this company is really worth.”279 Geithner
similarly has acknowledged that “[i]f AIG had been forced to mark all its assets to their
depressed market prices during a selling frenzy, then sure, it would’ve been insolvent.”280 He
has further explained, “we thought that once the crisis passed . . . there was a reasonable chance
AIG’s assets would be worth more than its liabilities.”281
Also noteworthy is that without the adverse effects rippling from Lehman’s failure, it
cannot be assumed that Fed and other policymakers would have coalesced around the idea that
AIG should receive government support. Even without Lehman’s failure, AIG’s exposures
might well have put it in a position where it could not have avoided filing for bankruptcy
without government support. In that event, the Fed would have to choose between the moral
hazard, and other risks, inherent in providing support and the adverse systemic ramifications of
allowing AIG to fail. The quality of the decision Fed policymakers could make, and the
magnitude of the risks of intervening, depended in significant part on the Fed’s capacity to
estimate the costs of allowing AIG to fail. The Fed’s lack of knowledge about AIG’s
interconnections, activities, and solvency, information available to Fed policymakers revealed,
may have resulted in the Fed erring in its assessment of the ramifications and perhaps taking a
different course than it did. It is thus entirely possible that under slightly different
circumstances, AIG would have been forced to file for bankruptcy, giving rise to adverse
systemic repercussions that may well have surpassed those triggered by Lehman’s failure.
E.

Easing Away from the Full Backstop

The role of the government only increased following the initial liquidity injection into
AIG. With the adoption of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) on
October 3, 2008, Congress provided financial regulators with significant additional tools and
resources to support the financial system, while also seeking to hold regulators accountable for
their actions.282 The centerpiece of EESA, TARP, authorized the Treasury Secretary to spend up
to $700 billion to purchase distressed assets, largely based on the plan conceived over the
summer by Paulson’s aides. In light of operational challenges, a desire to move more quickly
than that plan could be implemented, and other factors, Treasury redirected those funds, using
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them instead to inject capital directly into banks and certain other firms.283 That policymakers
failed to realize prior to the passage of EESA that buying distressed assets was not the best
response, combined with other dimensions of how policymakers handled that process---like the
“infamous three-page” version of the original TARP proposal, which in addition to being
incredibly bare bones also sought to shield the program from any meaningful oversight---raised
questions about whether leading policymakers were prepared for and able to handle the
challenges they were facing.284
Other programs further expanded the scope of government support. The Treasury
guaranteed all money market mutual funds.285 The Fed created a number of additional liquidity
facilities286 and, throughout this period and for years to follow, adopted an exceptionally
accommodative and increasingly creative approach to monetary policy.287 The Federal Deposit
Insurance Commission (FDIC) increased its level of coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per
eligible account type,288 insured deposits in excess of $250,000 if held in noninterest-bearing
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transaction accounts, and guaranteed banks’ issuance of certain long-term debt.289 By using
government backstops to reduce effective uncertainty and the ramifications of information
gaps, these programs had a significant and beneficial effect on financial activity.
The important role of these and other government interventions in restoring market
functioning and subsequently enabling the markets to function without such massive
government support is reflected in the Libor--OIS spread, the same measure used throughout
the first year of the Crisis to demonstrate that markets were in a state of significant and ongoing
dysfunction.290 Figure 2 extends the period covered past the first year to the full arch of the
Crisis, with notations for developments that appear to have had a particularly sizeable impact
on the spread. This expanded view supports the notion that the fumbling of early efforts to get
EESA adopted and to implement TARP adversely affected market functioning, but it also sheds
light on the government interventions that were particularly important in restoring market
functioning.
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One set of government initiatives that played a critical role in restoring market
functioning were the Treasury’s programs to recapitalize all of the largest financial institutions
and, subsequently, other banks.291 Pursuant to its Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the Treasury
Department invested more than $200 billion of the TARP funds in over 700 different financial

U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Capital Purchase Program, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-programs/cap/Pages/overview.aspx
[http://perma.cc/52GZ-6CEP] (last updated Oct. 16, 2015 12:02 PM) (describing Treasury’s Capital
Purchase Program).
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institutions.292 While the Libor--OIS spread is probably disproportionately affected by these
programs, as banks were the direct beneficiaries, the magnitude of the effect and the scope of
the programs make it clear that one of the reasons that liquidity support alone had failed to
quell the market dysfunction is that financial institutions were too thinly capitalized relative to
the risks to which they were exposed.
Another important development facilitating the ability of the markets to function
without widespread government backstops was the public disclosure of regulators’ assessments
of the capacity of the largest banks to withstand further adverse developments. Through the
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), 150 examiners and analysts from the Fed, the
OCC, and the FDIC evaluated how the nineteen largest banking organizations would fare
under specified adverse conditions.293 After asking banks to “estimate . . . losses and earnings . .
. under two alternative” scenarios, regulators “identif[ied] methodological weaknesses, missing
information, over-optimistic assumptions, and other problems,” “made judgmental adjustments
to the firms’ loss and revenue estimates,” and undertook other steps aimed “to achieve
methodological consistency” and improve accuracy.294
As Bernanke explained when the results were released, the “examinations were not tests
of solvency,” which had long been monitored and regulated.295 “Rather, the assessment
program was a forward-looking, ‘what-if’ exercise intended to . . . gauge the extent of the
additional capital buffer necessary to keep these institutions strongly capitalized and lending,
even if the economy performs worse than expected between now and the end of next year.”296 A
primary aim was to disseminate useful and credible information about bank health. As
Bernanke later explained, the Fed recognized that “[t]he loss of confidence we have seen in
some banking institutions has arisen not only because market participants expect the future loss
rates on many banking assets to be high, but because they also perceive the range of uncertainty
surrounding estimated loss rates as being unusually wide” and the SCAP “was designed to
reduce this uncertainty.”297

Id.
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program (May 11, 2009) [hereinafter Bernanke, May 11, 2009 Speech],
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090511a.htm [http://perma.cc/RUE7-85X7].
294 Id.
295 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke,
Statement Regarding the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (May 7, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bernankescap20090507.htm
[http://perma.cc/6MLG-HZBY].
296 Id. For more information about the methodology, see generally Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program: Design and Implementation (Apr. 24, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf
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The decision to disclose the results was controversial, as it runs against the strong
tendency of bank regulators to favor confidentiality and was questioned by numerous outside
commenters.298 It was made easier by the fact that the government could commit to providing
banks the capital they needed to address identified shortcomings.299 On net, Fed policymakers
seem to have decided that in light of the uncertainty that remained pervasive in 2009, “[e]ven a
mixed bag of information about the actual condition of banks was better than knowing nothing
and fearing a worst-case scenario.”300 The SCAP seemingly succeeded in reducing uncertainty
and promoting market activity.301 Bernanke opined later: “[T]he SCAP stands out for me as one
of the critical turning points in the financial crisis. It provided anxious investors with something
they craved: credible information about prospective losses at banks.”302
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

This Essay’s recounting of the first year of the Crisis, while necessarily heavily edited
relative to the volumes of primary materials from which the account is derived, remains closely
tethered to those materials. This Essay’s normative claim creates the framework for the
examination, but policymakers’ voices are retained throughout. This is important in part
because the account has implications beyond this Essay’s claims regarding how the Fed can best
use its LOLR authority.
One valuable lesson from this analysis, for example, is that the Crisis was in fact
underway for more than a year by the time Lehman Brothers failed. While this has been
acknowledged by many, it remains poorly understood by the public and even by some
otherwise quite informed academics and commentators. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for

See, e.g., Stavros Peristiani, Donald P. Morgan & Vanessa Savino, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff
Report No. 460, The Information Value of the Stress Test and Bank Opacity 1 (2010),
http://newyorkfed.org./research/staff_reports/sr460.pdf [http://perma.cc/799K-2NDS] (“The
announcement of the stress test was greeted with a mixture of trepidation and skepticism by financial
analysts, with some worrying that undercapitalized banks would be closed or nationalized based on the
test results, and others expecting a ‘white-wash . . . .’”); Donna Borak, The Increasing Leverage of Daniel
Tarullo, Am. Banker (July 28, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/magazine/123_8/the-increasingleverage-of-daniel-tarullo-1060538-1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1 [http://perma.cc/2HK6TU5G] (“Some on the board feared that the market would lose confidence in the banks if the results were
negative.”).
299 See Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, The Treasury Capital Assistance Program
and the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (May 6, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/20090506a.htm [http://perma.cc/JS4Q-WZXG] (noting SCAP complemented
by Treasury’s Capital Assistance Program (CAP), “which makes capital available to financial institutions
as a bridge to private capital in the future.”).
300 Borak, supra note 298 (describing Tarullo’s rationale for pushing for disclosure).
301 E.g., Peristiani, Morgan & Savino, supra note 298, at 4--11.
302 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Stress Testing Banks: What
Have We Learned? (Apr. 8, 2013), http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
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example, authored an influential law review article and subsequent book in which they argue
that during crises “rational legislators and judges [have] no real choice but to hand the reins to
the executive and hope for the best.”303 To support this claim, they have two examples--Congress’s decision to authorize the use of force shortly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and
Congress’s decision to authorize the Treasury to buy troubled assets shortly after Lehman failed
and AIG was bailed out in September 2008. While acknowledging differences between the
events, their analysis equates the failure of Lehman in September 2008 with the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 2001 and suggests that while in each case, there may have been
earlier signs of trouble, the problems were too amorphous prior to that time for regulators to
have been able to prod Congress into action.304 The examination here of the thirteen months
leading up to September 2008 tells a very different story, one with important implications for
the balance of power among the government actors involved.
If September 2008 had come out of the blue, then, consistent with Vermeule and
Posner’s account, effective crisis governance may well have required that the executive branch
take the lead and obtain exceptionally broad discretion from Congress about how best to
proceed. Recognizing that the Crisis had been going on for more than a year prior to the
disastrous events of September 2008 raises questions about whether the Fed and other financial
regulators should have sought greater authority from Congress earlier and if expectations that
they would be granted more authority with fewer strings attached might have been among
their reasons for not doing so. There are also questions about what Fed and other policymakers
communicated to members of Congress about their intentions when they sought approval for
EESA. For example, Bernanke’s recently released autobiography reveals that he believed that
injecting capital into banks was likely to be more effective than Paulson’s plan to try to buy
troubled assets from banks, and that Paulson had “assured [Bernanke] that the authority to
purchase assets would be written broadly enough to allow the government to purchase equity
shares in banks---that is, to inject government capital, my preferred approach---if that turned
out to be best.”305 Only by closely examining the full year leading up to the passage of EESA
and what policymakers knew during this period can we develop a more robust understanding
of the degree to which the Fed and other regulators shared critical information with Congress,
whether they may have withheld information, and the implications of those decisions.
More generally, the widespread tendency to talk about the “2008 financial crisis” elides
a critical period in that crisis, one that merits far greater attention than it has received in the
ongoing efforts to learn all of the lessons the Crisis has to teach. In providing a detailed account
of what Fed policymakers knew and believed at key junctures in this period, this Essay lays the
groundwork for these efforts to continue in a more informed and thus productive way. The

Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the
Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1613, 1614 (2009) [hereinafter, Posner & Vermeule, Crisis
Governance]; see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian
Republic (2011).
304 See Posner & Vermeule, Crisis Governance, supra note 303, at 1615--28.
305 Ben S. Bernanke, The Courage to Act: A Memoir of a Crisis and Its Aftermath 304 (2015).
303

64

remainder of this Essay leaves further examination to future work, and focuses instead on the
implications of this account for this Essay’s normative claims.
A.

Better Outcomes Were Possible

If the scale of the Crisis was fixed as of its start in August 2007, then the claim here is
moot. By contrast, if the alternative decisions that the Fed might have following the proposed
approach would have altered the course of the Crisis, this would provide strong support for
this Essay’s claims. Unfortunately, we will never know with certainty either way. It is
impossible to press rewind and see what would have happened under various alternative
scenarios, and trying to assess what might have been is an inherently speculative undertaking
and one inevitably biased by hindsight. Nonetheless, this is the type of enterprise that has been
employed repeatedly and productively in the wake of financial crises throughout history and is
how we learn from them.
This Part grapples with these challenges by focusing on the core issue of how a central
bank that recognized the difference between finite and persistent liquidity crises---and the
unique challenges and opportunities posed by the latter---may have responded differently
given what Fed officials knew and believed at the relevant junctures. It further assumes that
altering the paradigm for how a LOLR ought to respond during periods of prolonged distress
will alter the types of questions Congress, academics and others will pose to Fed officials when
seeking to hold them accountable for their actions. This latter layer is key, as it is the mechanism
for both addressing concerns about legitimacy and for reducing the capacity for Fed officials to
dodge responsibility when they were in a position that they could take productive actions by
utilizing their powers in the ways proposed. Again, the analysis is necessarily truncated in light
of space constraints, addressing only a few of the virtually endless alternative scenarios.
i.
The Early Stages. --- There are a number of ways that the Fed may have more
effectively used its LOLR and other sources of authority during the first seven months of the
Crisis, had it viewed itself as having the right and obligation to function as an information
coordination agent once it was clear the financial system was facing a persistent liquidity
shortage. For example, Fed officials were aware that a significant factor contributing to the
hesitance of financial institutions to work with one another was a lack of information about the
distribution of subprime exposures.306 Fed officials were also aware that they lacked a complete
understanding of these dynamics.307 Given the Fed’s willingness to cut the Fed funds rate twice
in January 2008 and the fact the Fed had already put the TAF in place, a Fed attuned to the
importance of information gaps might have also opted around that time to create a liquidity
facility designed to provide financial institutions access to relatively cheap liquidity in exchange
for (1) information about that institution’s direct and indirect exposures to subprime assets, (2)
the tools the institutions was using to assess the value and risks of such assets, and (3) any
efforts it had taken to mitigate such exposures. Such an intervention would have had a far
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smaller downside risk than the rate cuts and might have yielded an array of benefits, including
providing both the institutions and the Fed much needed information about the nature and
dispersion of such risk exposures and variations in the tools being used to assess their value. It
also may well have alerted the Fed to important connections among institutions, and, properly
executed, it may well have revealed the extensive one-way risk AIG had assumed as a result of
insuring such exposures.
Another move that the Fed might have taken around January would have been to focus
on the financial health of banks and other financial institutions. In addition to the other
important developments in January, this was the month that the specific findings presented to
the FOMC regarding the inadequacies in many banks’ risk management systems.308 Even at that
time, it was well known that capital is a backward-looking measure and that whether a bank is
adequately capitalized depends not only on the actual downside risks to which a bank is
exposed but also the bank’s capacity to identify and measure its risk exposures.309 Even under
the approaches to bank oversight then in place, the Fed and other prudential regulators could
have used deficient risk management systems as a basis for demanding that banks raise fresh
capital.310 Given that the large banks and investment banks may well have still been able to raise
capital in the market at that stage, and that thicker capital cushions at the largest and least wellmanaged institutions might have substantially improved the capacity of the financial system,
such a move might have significantly altered the course of the crisis. In short, even in light of
what Fed officials knew at the time, such a move had far greater upside than downside risks.
While such a move is contrary to bank regulators’ traditional predilection toward delay, it is
precisely because that predilection is so well established and so problematic that the Fed should
be expected to take the lead in identifying and prompting a timely response when the market is
signaling that there are reasons for concern.
Although there are numerous other productive actions a Fed focused on functioning as
an information coordination agent might well have taken during these very early stages, it is the
six months following the failure of Bear Stearns that is most ripe with missed opportunities.
After seven months of strained liquidity conditions, it was clear that the markets were
experiencing persistent liquidity shortages, and thus a change in approach would be
appropriate under the paradigm proposed here and Bear’s near-failure and the Fed’s responses
to it altered the course in ways that are central to the issue of how a LOLR can most effectively
use that authority.
ii.

After Bear.

See supra section III.B.
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a.
Lehman. --- Of the countless ways the situation with Lehman may have played
out differently, the analysis here will focus on just three, overlapping alternatives: (1) forcing
Lehman to make difficult decisions earlier than it did; (2) resolving the Lehman situation
without having Lehman file for bankruptcy; and (3) disseminating credible information about
counterparty exposures and otherwise better handling the resolution to mitigate the market
dysfunction caused by Lehman’s bankruptcy.311
One of the principal benefits of having the Fed use its authority to gather additional
information is that it may well have figured out well before September 2008 that Lehman’s
assets were worth less than they purported them to be, that Lehman was disseminating
deceptive information about its liquidity reserves, and that Lehman would likely not survive as
a stand-alone firm, at least not without a significant capital infusion. Lehman was losing money,
and assuming fresh risks, during much of the period in question. Other banks similarly faced
deteriorating health and increasing reliance on ever shorter term sources of financing during
this period, increasing the fragility of the overall system.312 Pushing up resolution of Lehman’s
situation may well have resulted in Lehman being acquired by Barclays or another financial
firm,313 and would likely increased the resiliency of the rest of the financial system, reducing the
ripple effects, if Lehman was nonetheless forced to file for bankruptcy.
Apart from the timing of the resolution, a better informed Fed may well have been able
to do more to avert the difficult decision of whether to bail out Lehman altogether. For example,
even with the regulatory regime then in place, the Fed could have used insights it gained
regarding Lehman’s precarious financial health to explain to the SEC why it should use its
supervisory authority to encourage Lehman to raise capital and otherwise improve its financial
health. The Fed also could have signaled to Lehman that ongoing access to the Fed’s two credit
facilities, which appear to have played a critical role in the willingness of Lehman’s
counterparties to continue working with the firm, would be conditioned on the firm selling
some of its illiquid assets and raising fresh capital. In light of the evidence that Lehman’s CEO,
Richard Fuld, failed to pursue other options in part because of expectations that government
support would be available if needed, signals to the contrary may have altered his assessment
of a range of options, increasing his willingness to raise capital on terms he may not have found
otherwise desirable or to initiate discussions of a possible merger.
A distinct way the Lehman situation would likely have played out quite differently had
the Fed been playing the role of information coordination agent is that, even holding all else
constant, the Fed might have been able to mitigate the ripple effects emanating from Lehman’s
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failure. A study by the FDIC suggests that had Lehman’s resolution been conducted under the
FDIC’s control rather than through bankruptcy, the value destroyed would have been a small
fraction of the overall value destroyed by its bankruptcy.314 Even without the changes wrought
by the Dodd-Frank Act the report explains a number of ways that, had the overall process been
handled in a more coordinated fashion, much of the value destruction could have been
avoided.315 A more informed Fed might also have been able to reduce the ramifications of
Lehman’s failure by reducing the effective uncertainty that it triggered. Throughout the Crisis,
interconnections among financial institutions played a key role in magnifying distress, and the
Fed explicitly recognized the importance of such interconnections in explaining the assistance it
provided to Bear Stearns. Had the Fed gathered reliable information about other banks’
exposures to Lehman and the protection they had in place, the Fed could have publicized this
information when Lehman ultimately failed. Given the prominent role that lack of information
about other banks’ exposures to Lehman played in helping to explain the magnitude of the
fallout, this type of information may have meaningfully reduced the market dysfunction that
followed.316 In sum, there is a reasonable basis for thinking that the Lehman failure may have
been averted or its effects reduced substantially had the Fed been using its LOLR authority in
the manner here proposed.317
b.
AIG. --- In order to understand how the proposed approach would have
increased the probability of a favorable outcome with respect to AIG, it is critical to evaluate
what happened and what could have happened in probabilistic terms. With the benefit of
hindsight, it is clear that, contingent upon there being no other changes in the period leading up
to September 16, 2008, providing AIG the liquidity it needed to continue operations was likely
the correct action for the Fed to take. That said, the correctness of that decision was in no small
part a matter of luck.
As an initial matter, AIG was facing potential downgrades in its credit rating for reasons
quite apart from Lehman’s bankruptcy.318 It is entirely possible that AIG would have faced
those downgrades, and the accompanying demands for collateral from counterparties that
ultimately crippled and nearly destroyed the firm, before Lehman’s demise. And, it is far from
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clear that had AIG run out of liquidity first, policymakers would have been willing to provide it
the requested aid. At least part of the reason that Fed and other policymakers allowed Lehman
to fail was that they were concerned about moral hazard and they underestimated the
ramifications of allowing it to fail.319 In light of how little they knew, they could easily have
made similar miscalculations with respect to AIG if they did not have the additional and gamechanging data point of the market’s reaction to Lehman’s bankruptcy. Moreover, while with the
benefit of hindsight, we know that AIG was highly interconnected with other financial
institutions and non-financial firms and the uncertainty and other ripple effects of allowing it to
fail may well have dwarfed the effects of Lehman’s bankruptcy. Nonetheless, at the time,
policymakers knew little about AIG and its interconnections and these other considerations,
significantly hampering their capacity to make informed judgments about the ramifications of
alternative courses of actions they may well have pursued.
Another critical consideration when assessing the bailout of AIG in probabilistic terms is
solvency. At the time the Fed initially made available to AIG a $85 billion credit facility, Fed
officials had quite limited information about the firm’s financial health and did not actually
know whether it was solvent.320 The government itself has highlighted its “prior unfamiliarity
with AIG,” in a lawsuit challenging the terms of the bailout.321 While the government got lucky,
that fact doesn’t change that the minimal information the government possessed increased the
credit and other risks the government assumed when it authorized the initial facility to support
AIG.
It is also possible that had the Fed gathered more information about AIG’s one-way bet
on subprime and other MBS, it could have worked with AIG and its regulators to do more to
address its liquidity management and capitalization prior to September 2008. AIG’s financial
health suggests it may have been able to raise new capital had it been compelled, or even
strongly encouraged, to do so earlier.322 Such actions may have averted the need for it to seek
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support from the Fed and, even if the Fed still got involved, these actions would have reduced
the credit risk and moral hazard arising from the intervention.
A significant shortcoming of the government’s handling of these matters, relevant to
both Lehman and AIG, is preparedness, or lack thereof. The events of September 2008 reveal all
too clearly that the Fed and other leading financial policymakers did not have a clear plan of
action for how they would respond in the face of a possible failure of Lehman or AIG. Fed
policymakers knew far less than they could have about the health of either firm, the value of the
assets each held, and the nature of their connections to other financial institutions. There also
seems to have been remarkably little communication among key policymakers about how they
would respond to such an eventuality.323 While nothing can be assured, if the Fed had a better
understanding of the probability that either firm would require liquidity support and the chain
reactions that might occur if they were allowed to fail, or if Fed officials expected to be held
accountable under the paradigm proposed here, Fed policymakers may well have done more to
prepare. In addition to being helpful for the reasons given, this might have enabled
policymakers to appear more informed when seeking greater authority from Congress after
Lehman failed, which may have independently reduced the magnitude of the fallout.324
The final point to highlight is that a more informed Fed could have sought greater
authority to address the challenges it was facing or worked more closely with regulators who
had the powers that the Fed lacked. The scope of the Fed’s authority is not fixed; it can always
be expanded or contracted by Congress.325 In the wake of Bear’s failure, some members of
Congress seemed open to expanding the Fed’s oversight to reach the investment banks and
potentially other systemically important institutions. Had the Fed used its LOLR authority to
learn more about the interconnections among Lehman and other banks, the amount of one-way
risk AIG had assumed, or other sources of fragility, the Fed may have sought---and gotten--Congress to act far sooner than it did. This seems particularly likely given that the competence
of the OTS, the SEC, and state insurance regulators---at least with respect to their oversight of
systemically important financial institutions and their capacity to understand and address the
systemic ramifications of problems at those institutions---had been revealed to be clearly
wanting. The inherent elasticity of the regulatory authority and the capacity of expert regulators
to play a meaningful role helping Congress to understand the nature of the challenges that they
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are facing and the tools needed to address them are thus highly relevant in assessing how the
thirteen months here at issue may have been better utilized.
B.

Liquidity and Information

Financial crises are not all-or-nothing events. Size matters. Throughout the period here
at issue, the country was in the midst of a financial crisis that it was too late to avert.
Nonetheless, the costs that the Crisis would inflict on the real economy were not a foregone
conclusion. Nor was the amount of moral hazard from expanding the government safety net
and the corresponding need for a large-scale regulatory overhaul to address it. The analysis
here suggests that had the Fed accepted that it could and should use its LOLR authority in the
ways proposed, the depths that followed might not have been so deep.
More generally, the unfolding of the Crisis detailed here is consistent with this Essay’s
claim that persistent liquidity shortages merit distinct treatment and the importance of
information in efforts to address persistent liquidity shortages. Through actions like changes in
the term of its discount window operations, adoption of the TAF, the two credit facilities
instituted to support primary dealers in March 2008, the backstop enabling JP Morgan’s
acquisition of Bear Stearns, the Fed was actively seeking to pump fresh liquidity into the system
throughout the period here at issue. Those efforts resulted in modest but incomplete
improvements in market functioning. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that those efforts
failed to bring about a more lasting restoration of market functioning because they were
symptoms of deeper ills plaguing the financial system that liquidity alone could not resolve. As
reflected in the market’s response to the CPP and Treasury’s related programs, one of the core
challenges was that market participants accurately perceived that many banks and other
financial institutions held insufficient capital in light of the risks to which they were exposed.
The market’s response to the stress tests, meanwhile, suggests the way that market participants’
lack of information also contributed to that dysfunction. Looking further back, the discussions
among Fed policymakers throughout the first year show that both of these were issues to which
they were attuned, even if they failed to fully investigate or address them, well before
September 2008.
Further affirming the importance of rethinking how the Fed can best use its LOLR
authority, the case study illustrates the downsides of the Fed’s willingness to provide liquidity
during periods of prolonged market dysfunction. Without the Fed’s LOLR interventions,
market participants would very likely have had to make difficult decisions earlier than they did.
Had regulators used the intervening period to develop a more comprehensive game plan for
addressing foreseeable contingencies, or otherwise used the intervening time to bring about
changes that would enhance the capacity of the financial system to withstand further adverse
developments, this delay might have proved quite useful. As it was, the intervening period was
one during which the overall system became increasingly fragile and regulators became only
minimally more prepared, suggesting that the short-term benefits derived from the Fed’s LOLR
interventions ultimately may have done as much harm as good.
The Fed’s LOLR authority is a tool; it is not a panacea. The preceding analysis reveals a
number of issues that could not or should not have been addressed by the Fed using the
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leverage it enjoys by virtue of controlling access to liquidity. Nonetheless, it does show how a
more robust use of this tool can function as a critical first step in devising a more
comprehensive response in the face of a budding financial crisis. It identifies a number of ways
that the Fed plausibly could have used its LOLR authority to become better informed and how
Fed policymakers may have made different---and better---choices, had they done so. It further
suggests some ways that the Fed could have used its LOLR authority to strategically facilitate
the dissemination of information in ways that may have reduced effective uncertainty and
promoted market functioning. The Fed alone cannot bring an end to all financial crises, but by
serving as an information coordination agent, it can more effectively fulfill its longstanding role
at the forefront of efforts to contain a growing financial crisis.
V.

CHALLENGES

This Part assesses some challenges and drawbacks of having the Fed use its LOLR
authority to pursue aims beyond directly counteracting liquidity shortages. The potential
concerns are myriad, and often different in kind. As reflected in the ongoing debates about
whether the Fed should enjoy more or less authority to lend to nonbank financial institutions
and even to banks,326 there are a wide range of perspectives on these matters. The concerns
include both issues of accountability---e.g., are there sufficient mechanisms in place to ensure
the Fed uses the significant discretion it enjoys to further Congressionally endorsed and
popularly acceptable aims and will the proposed paradigm shift enhance or detract from efforts
to promote accountability---and efficacy---e.g., are the theorized gains from the proposed
paradigm shift ones that can actually be realized in practice. Rather than trying to categorize or
create a hierarchy among these competing voices, this Essay seeks simply to identify the most
pressing concerns that might argue against the proposed course. In analyzing these issues and
suggesting most can be addressed if the paradigm shift is appropriately implemented, this Part

See Federal Reserve Reform Act of 2015, 114th Cong. § 11 (2015),
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-114hr-pih-frr-h001058.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SK57-F2D4] (proposing restrictions on Fed’s special lending powers that would
narrow circumstances under which Fed could lend to nonbank financial firms); Centennial Monetary
Commission Act of 2015, H.R. 2912, 114th Cong. § 4 (2015) (calling for establishment of new commission
to “evaluate various operational regimes under which the . . . [Fed] may conduct monetary policy”);
Examining Federal Reform Proposals: Testimony Before the Monetary Policy & Trade Subcomm. of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 3--4 (2015) (statement of Donald Kohn) (emphasizing importance of
Fed’s emergency lending powers for nonbanks); Examining Federal Reform Proposals: Testimony Before
the Monetary Policy & Trade Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 12--13 (2015)
(statement of Paul H. Kupiec) (claiming proposed restrictions on Fed’s emergency lending powers for
nonbanks help remove concerns that Fed “could once again legally lend to stop . . . a financial firm from
failing”); see also Requirements for the Fed to Describe Its Strategy: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. 1 (2015) (statement of John B. Taylor) (advocating for
legislation requiring Fed to provide Congress with clear rule describing its monetary policy); Reforming
the Federal Reserve System: Structure Over Functions, Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.
& Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. 8--10 (2015) (statement of Peter Conti-Brown) (attacking bill supported by
Taylor).
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also provides guidance regarding how the ideas proposed here could be translated into
workable policies.
A.

Friction

Perhaps the biggest risk associated with imposing additional conditions on a bank’s
ability to access liquidity from the Fed is that doing so would deter borrowing. This could be
problematic because liquidity shortfalls remain an aggravator of systemic distress and concerns
about stigma can depress usage in dramatic and nonlinear ways.
As a preliminary matter, if conditions are imposed in connection with access rather than
usage and firms have little or no discretion about being in the eligible pool, then the conditions
should not affect usage. This is precisely the approach the Fed used when it put its on-site teams
at the investment banks in connection with the PDCF, proving its viability. Moreover, even
when imposed in connection with use of a Fed facility, certain conditions may actually
encourage use. Imposing a meaningful solvency requirement, which the Fed could verify only
by accessing additional information about an institution’s health and risk exposure, might
encourage solvent banks to borrow as a way of signaling the Fed’s faith in their financial
health.327 Similarly, the very framing of the LOLR activity advocated here is quite different than
the type of borrowing that has traditionally given rise to stigma. There is no reason that use of a
facility designed with the express aim of providing exceptionally cheap liquidity to financial
institutions in exchange for the institution providing information and otherwise helping the Fed
to maintain the stability of the overall system should create any stigma. If anything, like a
meaningful solvency condition, the willingness to be open and work with the Fed may send
positive signals to the market.
Even if some conditions would be costly to comply with, because of stigma concerns or
otherwise, these frictions should be sufficiently modest, particularly when focusing on aims like
information generation.328 In light of the Fed’s capacity to simultaneously employ multiple
facilities and other mechanisms to inject additional liquidity into the market, the potential
frictions that might result from imposing additional conditions are more likely to be factors
influencing when and how the Fed pursues additional goals, not whether it should.
B.

Other Operational Challenges

Another challenge is that the proposed aims are not self-executing. Many require
expertise, in addition to leverage, to implement effectively and some may face additional

See Tucker, supra note 2, at 20--21 (“Rather than use of the discount window being tantamount to
being given the ‘Black Spot’, it could instead be a signal that the central bank was confident that the firm
was fundamentally sound.”).
328 Cf. id. (emphasizing frictions created by stigma concerns when central banks lend for purposes of
solvency support rather than information gathering).
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procedural challenges.329 These too are genuine challenges, but also ones that the Fed should
have the capacity to address. With respect to gathering information, for example, the Fed could
begin by reassigning some of the bank examiners it already employs to the new institutions or
markets. The Fed could also hire new staff, use outside advisers, or ask eligible banks to second
employees with the appropriate skills to the Fed as a condition of eligibility. All of these
alternatives entail challenges, but the very existence of so many alternatives suggests these are
challenges that could be overcome. A similar array of imperfect but viable options likely exists
with respect to the other operational challenges that would inevitably arise in the process of
implementing these proposals.
Related to the general operational challenges is the issue of cost. Seeking to achieve
many of the priorities identified here would entail expenditures. Depending on the scale of the
program and the use of outside advisers, these costs could seem significant. Yet, focusing on
costs is more likely to support than undermine this Essay’s claim. Most of the costs that the Fed
would incur implementing the proposed approach are knowable and limited. Hence, even if the
Fed errs by gathering information that ultimately is not that useful or the situation improves
without further government intervention, the downside is likely to be modest. This stands in
stark contrast to the downside risk associated with other interventions that the Fed may use. If
the Fed is too quick to lower the fed funds rate, for example, or keeps it too low for too long,
possible effects include inflation and creating conditions that are conducive to asset bubbles,
increasing the likelihood of a future crisis.330 It is precisely because there are such significant
drawbacks to using the tools otherwise available to the Fed to combat a potential crisis that the
more moderate costs and other drawbacks of the proposed approach weigh so heavily in favor
of its utilization.
C.

Bypass the Fed

A related challenge is that banks may respond by seeking government-backed liquidity
from sources other than the Fed. During the early stages of the Crisis, for example, banks
substantially increased their reliance on loans from the Federal Home Loan Banks as a source of
funding and liquidity.331 Some banks also used the lure of excessively high rates of interest to
retain and attract insured deposits.332 Rather than suggesting that the Fed should avoid using
the types of conditions contemplated here, however, these dynamics affirm the importance of
policy changes to reduce banks’ capacity to use these alternative programs to access

See, e.g., Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, §___, 94 Stat. 2812, _____ (codified as
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501--3521 (2012)) (requiring agencies to obtain approval from Office of
Management and Budget for any “information collection request”).
330 Richard A. Posner, Afterword to What Caused the Financial Crisis ___, 279 (Jeffrey Friedman ed.,
2011).
331 Viral V. Acharya et al., Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Rep. No. 623, How Do Global Banks Scramble
for Liquidity? Evidence from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Freeze of 2007, at 2 (2013).
332 See id. at 6 fn.8, 16--18 (finding banks attempted to increase short-term liquidity at the end of 2007 by
growing time deposits).
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government-backed liquidity.333 Moreover, there are limitations on the extent to which banks
can rely on each of these alternative discount windows, and neither can be used by nonbank
financial institutions, so the Fed retains significant leverage even if they persist.334
D.

Information Does Not Ensure Action

A distinct challenge is that much of the analysis here presumes that better information
would lead to better action. While generally true, information does not always lead to
understanding, and understanding does not ensure wise action. A report, prepared at the
behest of the New York Fed, suggests that at least with respect to the Fed’s supervisory
division, there may be reasons for concern.335 This is a serious issue and, like the last one, should
be addressed for reasons apart from the issues raised here. At the same time, the analysis in Part
III revealed many Fed policymakers recognized the limits of their knowledge, wanted to better
understand what was actually going on, and seemed ready to modify their response
accordingly. Additionally, the aim of calling for a change in paradigm regarding how the Fed
should use its LOLR is to also transform the standard against which the Fed’s actions will be
measured. Policymakers who anticipate being held accountable if they fail to use their authority
to gather pertinent and available information and to timely identify threats may well become
more diligent in those efforts, even if they might not otherwise be so disposed.
E.

One Tool, Multiple Aims

A final challenge is that the proposal muddies the waters surrounding the Fed’s various
instruments and aims. According to the ‘Tinbergen principle,’ policymakers should have at
least one independent policy instrument for each policy objective, and such an approach has
real virtues.336 Nonetheless, there has never been such purity in the Fed’s operations.337 The Fed
has long been tasked with achieving a number of overlapping policy aims, and it has been given
a range of tools to help it further those aims. In practice, the relationship between those tools
and the policy aims it seeks to achieve has never been cleanly delineated, and there may be
benefits to a little fuzziness in this regard.338 Thus, while the proposal here may muddy the

For a fuller critique of the institutional competencies of these liquidity providers and other reasons
such alternative programs should be revised, see Kathryn Judge, Three Discount Windows, 99 Cornell L.
Rev. 795, 837--55 (2014).
334 Id. at 837, 840 (suggesting alternative discount windows are subject to external constraints which may
make them less useful to banks as liquidity shortages persist).
335 Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Report on Systemic Risk and Bank Supervision 2 (Aug. 18, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1303305/2009-08-18-frbny-reporton-systemic-risk-and.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting NY Fed has “a culture that is
too risk-averse to respond quickly and flexibly to new challenges”).
336 Jan Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy (1952).
337 See supra Part I.
338 See, e.g., Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, Macroprudential Policy---a Literature Review (Bank for
Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 337, 2011) (recognizing “in practice, the different policy tools and
objectives of monetary, macroprudential and microprudential policy are interrelated”).
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water, it does so in an environment where the water is already quite muddy and where that
may be optimal.
CONCLUSION
Financial crises are inevitable. The amount of damage a crisis inflicts on the economy,
however, can vary dramatically. So, too, can the amount of moral hazard created by the
government’s response. This is not a new insight. A primary reason central banks are
empowered to provide liquidity is the recognition that insufficient liquidity can cause a modest
crisis to explode into something much more serious. Nonetheless, insufficient liquidity is not
the only factor that can aggravate systemic distress, and the provision of government liquidity
uncoupled from an effort to redress the underlying problems causing liquidity shortages to
persist can increase the fragility of the overall system. Thus, once a financial crisis takes hold, a
central bank should couple efforts to provide liquidity with efforts to address the underlying
problems causing those liquidity shortages to persist. This means that the central bank should
use its authority to understand how risks are allocated across the financial system, the nature of
interconnections within that system, and other sources of fragility. The central bank should then
use these insights to help the market resume functioning without the aid of the central bank.
This is not a project for the central bank alone. When market dysfunction persists, it is usually a
sign that market participants lack critical information and that the information they have
suggests there is too little loss-bearing capital in relation to how risk are distributed. By using its
LOLR authority, in conjunction with its other sources of authority, to serve as an information
coordination agent, a central bank can help spearhead the efforts required to address these
deficiencies. In drawing attention to limitations in current conceptions of the appropriate role of
a LOLR and offering a new paradigm, this Essay contributes to the ongoing efforts to learn from
the Crisis and to enable the Fed and other central banks to more effectively contain the next
financial crisis.
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